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Illuminating Innumeracy
Lisa Milot †
“I know for me, I’m a lawyer because I was bad at [science and
math]. All lawyers in the room, you know it’s true. We can’t
add and subtract, so we argue.” *
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Introduction
It is an open secret that lawyers don’t like math. Tales of lawyers
who chose the profession over business or medicine at least in part
because of discomfort with math are legion, as are reports of math
avoidance by lawyers once in the profession. 1 Many lawyers treat
†

Assistant Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. I
thank Dan Coenen, Paul Heald, Scott Richert, Arden Rowell, and
James Ryan for their invaluable comments, support, and guidance in
researching and writing this Article.

*

Michelle Obama, Remarks by the First Lady at the National Science
Foundation Family-Friendly Policy Rollout (Sept. 26, 2011).

1.

See Myrna S. Raeder, Cost-Benefit Analysis, Unintended Consequences,
and Evidentiary Policy: A Critique and a Rethinking of the Application
of a Single Set of Evidence Rules to Civil and Criminal Cases, 19
Cardozo L. Rev. 1585, 1590 (1998) (“Unquestionably, math phobia
was the impetus for many of us to attend law school, rather than pursue
other professions.”); Martha Ann Sisson & Amy Leafe McCormack,
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explicitly math-centric fields, such as tax law and bankruptcy, as
impenetrable specialties to be avoided at all costs, segregated even on
the judicial level with their own dedicated courts. With the exception
of empirical articles and those employing an explicitly economic
approach, most legal scholars avoid even the whiff of quantitative
analysis in their writings, in part to avoid discouraging use of their
ideas by lawyers, legislators, and judges uncomfortable with numerical
notations and formulas. 2
To be clear, it is not only lawyers who struggle with numbers and
their calculation. A 2003 study found that only 13% of American adults
were “proficient” at quantitative tasks and that only 78% could
perform even simple, single-step arithmetic. 3 One study, even though it
focused on college-educated individuals, found that nearly half of the
subjects could not solve basic problems involving probabilities or
convert percentages to proportions.4 Most of us fare little better in the
real world; for example, we avoid financial calculations such as the
amount needed for retirement, and we fail to assess and rebalance
retirement portfolios.5 Innumeracy is widespread, even among the most
educated and successful Americans.
The profession of law, though, has embraced innumeracy in
curious and significant ways that other professions have not. The Law
School Admissions Test is the only major post-secondary admissions

Success in 21st Century Private Practice: Retooling for an Enterprise
Culture, UVA Law., Fall 2009, at 32, 33 (“Over the years, we have
heard many lawyers muse that they would have attended business school
if they were not math-phobic.”); see also Michelle Obama, Remarks by the
First Lady at the National Science Foundation Family-Friendly Policy
Rollout (Sept. 26, 2011).
2.

See, e.g., Thomas D. Lyon & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Relevance
Ratio: Evaluating the Probative Value of Expert Testimony in Child
Sexual Abuse Cases, 82 Cornell L. Rev. 43, 49 (1996) (“We . . .
dispense with much of the mathematical notation which has discouraged
even quantitatively minded jurists from applying the relevance ratio in a
wider range of cases.”).

3.

Mark Kutner et al., Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, A First
Look at the Literacy of America’s Adults in the 21st Century
3–4 (2005).

4.

Isaac M. Lipkus et al., General Performance on a Numeracy Scale
Among Highly Educated Samples, 21 Med. Decision Making 37, 39
(2001). This study confirmed prior findings in less-educated populations.
See id. at 38 (summarizing prior research).

5.

See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated
Disclosure, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 647, 728 (2011) (“Rather than choosing
investments, employees often leave pension money wherever their
employer puts it.”).
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examination without a math component. 6 Law students are assumed
to lack mathematical backgrounds, and it is well accepted that they are
not interested in understanding even basic mathematical concepts. 7
Moreover, many law professors share the math aversion of their
students so that the numerical aspects of cases are often left
unexplored in class or even edited out of casebooks. As a result, little
math is found in the typical law school classroom.
Not surprisingly, law students who are uncomfortable with math
become lawyers who self-identify as “bad at math.” Indeed, innumeracy is at times almost celebrated within the legal profession. Lawyers
bond openly over their distaste for math and accept the same in
others. Those who are competent at—or even enjoy—math are seen
as an oddity. Only occasionally is the profession’s math paralysis
criticized or even questioned. 8
That lawyers are bad at math has become a truism, so that
whether we are actually bad at math is subsumed by our image of
6.

See Mary Ann Glendon, A Nation Under Lawyers: How the
Crisis in the Legal Profession is Transforming American
Society 202–03 (1994) (providing an overview of the types of
intelligence for which the Law School Admissions Test evaluates). While
the Medical College Admission Test no longer has a separate
quantitative analysis section, basic mathematical competence, including
arithmetic, calculation of percentages, calculation of proportions, and
estimates of square roots, is tested as part of the biological and physical
sciences sections of the exam. Physical and Biological Sciences Cognitive
Skills, Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls. 4 (2012), https://www.aamc.org/
students/download/285238/data/phyandbiocogskills.pdf.

7.

For a more complete discussion of law students, law school, and math,
see infra Part III.

8.

For example, in noting that the symposium for which his paper was
written was held in 1997 and marked the anniversary of legislation
signed into law in 1986, Professor David Hyman stated that “Only
lawyers, whose inadequacies in mathematics are well-documented, could
conclude that the symposium marked [the legislation’s] tenth
anniversary.” David A. Hyman, Patient Dumping and EMTALA: Past
Imperfect/Future Shock, 8 Health Matrix 29, 29 n.1 (1998). On a
more technical level, in analyzing Internal Revenue Code § 673, which
provides that a grantor is treated as the owner of a trust in which he
has retained a reversion if, at the time the trust is funded, the reversion
is greater than 5% of the value of the portion of the trust to which the
reversion applies, Lawrence Katzenstein described a statutory exception
as being “included for the benefit of lawyers who aren’t good at math,”
since the described scenario could never exceed the 5% threshold.
Lawrence P. Katzenstein, Planning with Grantor Trusts, in Estate
Planning in Depth 1053, 1058 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, June 23–
28, 2002), WL SG094 ALI-ABA 1053; cf. Lyon & Koehler, supra note
2, at 49 n.26 (listing Judge Jack Weinstein and Judge Frank
Easterbrook as “notable exceptions in an otherwise remarkably mathphobic population” of judges).
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ourselves—and others’ image of us—as such. 9 Yet lawyers in all types
of practices must grapple with mathematical issues. 10 Are we competent
to do so? 11 If at least a sizable portion of the bar is innumerate, why is
this the case—is it objective math competence or subjective math
confidence that we lack? And, either way, are our mathematical
failings corrected by the checks and balances of legal practice and the
legal system, or should we, as members of the legal profession, change
our approach to math?
Innumeracy is an issue we must confront: numerical information
is pervasive and calculations are central to the practice of many areas
of law. 12 Yet many math mistakes in the law and legal practice
remain unacknowledged and uncorrected because in our discomfort
with numbers we assign undue weight to them, lack the language to
engage with numerical ideas, and limit our ability to represent our
clients with respect to some of the more interesting and novel legal
issues arising in our technological world. 13 Ultimately, innumeracy
prevents us from thinking critically about the information and
assumptions underlying numbers and compromises transparency and
comprehensibility in the law, undermining legal authority.
To date, academic attention has focused primarily on the innumeracy of jurors 14 and of the American public generally. 15 But the spotlight
9.

An internet search with the terms “lawyer” and “bad at math” returns
approximately 883,000 hits. http://www.google.com/ (search “lawyer”
“bad at math”) (last visited Feb. 13, 2013).

10.

See infra Part II.

11.

Intriguingly, a preliminary empirical study of the numeracy of law
students shows that they are both better and worse at math than
graduate students in other fields. The study suggests that while many law
students have a high degree of numeracy, a troubling number (3%)—more
than in other programs—is genuinely innumerate: incapable of correctly
answering even a single, simple arithmetic problem. See Arden Rowell &
Jessica L. Bregant, Numeracy and Legal Decisionmaking (Ill. Pub. Law
& Legal Theory Research Paper Series No. 13-29, 2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=2163645.

12.

See infra Part III.

13.

See infra Part III.

14.

See, e.g., Joseph H. King, Jr., Pain and Suffering, Noneconomic
Damages, and the Goals of Tort Law, 57 SMU L. Rev. 163 (2004)
(discussing jury difficulties calculating awards for pain and suffering);
Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the
Legal Process, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1329 (1971) (noting the danger of jury
overvaluation of numerical analysis).

15.

See, e.g., Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 5 (exploring the failure of
mandated disclosure laws to protect personal autonomy, in part because
of the high rate of consumer innumeracy); Susan Block-Lieb, Mandatory
Protections as Veiled Punishments: Debtor Education in H.R. 975, The
Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer Protection Act of 2003, 69 Brook. L.
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has rarely been focused where it belongs: on practicing lawyers 16 and
lawmakers, 17 as well as law students and the law professors who
prepare them for their future roles in the legal community. In this
Article, I distinguish between three types of mathematical errors
commonly made by lawyers: miscalculations, oversimplifications, and
misapplications of mathematical principles. I argue that these errors
matter because of the centrality of numerical information to the
practice of many areas of law. In order to better understand the origins
of this innumeracy and begin to move towards a more numerate
approach to the law, I distinguish objective innumeracy—a lack of
math competence—from subjective innumeracy—a lack of math
confidence. Finally, I conclude by offering practical suggestions for
beginning to overcome innumeracy in the legal profession. Dealing head
on with these fundamental challenges holds the promise of greatly
improving how we think about and practice law.

Rev. 425 (2004) (debtor education); Christopher C. Fennell & Lee Anne
Fennell, Fear and Greed in Tax Policy: A Qualitative Research Agenda,
13 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 75 (2003) (taxpayer filing decisions); David
Adam Friedman, Free Offers: A New Look, 38 N.M. L. Rev. 49 (2008)
(debtor disclosures); Bailey Kuklin, Probability Misestimates in Medical
Care, 59 Ark. L. Rev. 527 (2006) (medical risk assessments); Ann
Morales Olazábal & Howard Marmorstein, Structured Products for the
Retail Market: The Regulatory Implications of Investor Innumeracy and
Consumer Information Processing, 52 Ariz. L. Rev. 623 (2010)
(investor innumeracy).
16.

A rare exception is Professor Laurence Tribe’s 1971 article critiquing a
prosecutor’s incorrect use of probabilistic evidence in a criminal trial.
See Tribe, supra note 14, at 1335–38. For further discussion of this case,
see infra notes 72–78 and accompanying text.

17.

In a few instances, commentators have discussed mathematical errors by
judges. See, e.g., Paul H. Edelman, Getting the Math Right: Why
California Has Too Many Seats in the House of Representatives, 59
Vand. L. Rev. 297 (2006) (arguing that the Supreme Court made a
math error in United States Department of Commerce v. Montana, 503
U.S. 442 (1992)); David L. Faigman, “Normative Constitutional FactFinding”: Exploring the Empirical Component of Constitutional
Interpretation, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 541 (1991) (reviewing the Supreme
Court’s use of empirical research in constitutional interpretation);
Michael I. Meyerson & William Meyerson, Significant Statistics: The
Unwitting Policy Making of Mathematically Ignorant Judges, 37 Pepp.
L. Rev. 771 (2010) (analyzing areas of the law where the “mathematical
ignorance” of judges has subverted legal goals); Lars Noah, An
Inventory of Mathematical Blunders in Applying the Loss-of-a-Chance
Doctrine, 24 Rev. Litig. 369 (2005) (cataloguing instances of
computational and conceptual errors in the calculation of “loss of a
chance” damages in tort law).
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I.

Enumerating Legal Innumeracy

Lawyers’ discomfort with numbers and their calculation can be
seen in the ways we approach mathematical issues in the law. As an
initial matter, in many instances lawyers simply avoid math.
At times, this avoidance reflects our wariness about the potential
for laypersons to assign undue weight to numerical evidence. So, for
example, in People v. Collins, 18 mathematics professor Daniel Martinez
provided expert testimony concerning probability theory in an effort to
establish the likelihood that the defendants in question had committed
the crime with which they were charged. Upon appeal, the California
Supreme Court expressed concern with the power of probabilistic
evidence and warned that “[m]athematics, a veritable sorcerer in our
computerized society, while assisting the trier of fact in the search for
truth, must not cast a spell over him.” 19 In particular, the court worried
that the jury lacked the competence to properly contextualize the
probabilistic evidence with which it had been presented and, as a
result, overvalued it in deciding the defendants’ guilt. 20
Professor Laurence Tribe has since expanded on this concern, 21
criticizing the use of “explicitly statistical evidence or overtly
probabilistic arguments” at trial. 22 A mathematician himself, 23 Tribe
believes that the risk that jurors might overvalue numerical data due
to the precision and “overbearing impressiveness of numbers” is too
great. 24 Thus, he prefers that jurors be allowed to make inductive
inferences rather than be presented with explicitly quantified
information. 25 Later commentators have echoed this idea. 26
18.

People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33 (Cal. 1968) (en banc).

19.

Id. at 33. In addition to the concern with overvaluation, the court
reviewed the many factual errors made by the prosecution at trial,
producing meaningless calculations of probability. See George Fisher,
Evidence 73 (2d ed. 2008); see also infra notes 72–78 and
accompanying text.

20.

Collins, 438 P.2d at 40. The court pointed to flaws in the evidence
presented but reserved its harshest criticism for the power of
mathematics in the courtroom.

21.

Professor Tribe was, in fact, the architect behind the Collins opinion. At
the time of the decision, he clerked for Justice Tobriner who assisted in
drafting the opinion. See Fisher, supra note 19, at 73 (detailing Tribe’s
role in assisting Justice Tobriner).

22.

Tribe, supra note 14, at 1330.

23.

Professor Tribe graduated summa cum laude in Mathematics from
Harvard College prior to his legal career. Laurence H. Tribe, Harvard
L. Sch., http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/directory/index.html?id=
74 (last visited Feb. 13, 2013).

24.

Tribe, supra note 14, at 1361.

25.

Id. at 1331 & n.2.
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At other times, math avoidance may reflect a conscious legal
strategy, born of a belief that “[a]necdotal evidence is vivid and
reaches us in a way that . . . statistical information cannot.” 27 In this
view, storytelling is a preferred advocacy tactic, providing context and
color, and thus a saliency to the jury, in a way numbers cannot. For
example, Michael Saks and Robert Kidd have argued that:
Research demonstrates . . . that people do not process
probabilistic information well, that in the face of particularistic
information, they cannot integrate the statistical and anecdotal
evidence and consequently tend to ignore the statistical
information. Intuitive, heuristic, human decision makers must
dispense with certain information, and that tends strongly to be
the quantitative information. While commentators’ arguments
have been that the data are inordinately persuasive, the
evidence says the reverse is true. 28

This reasoning resonates with the actual experience of jurors in
Collins, who later reported that they had disregarded Professor
Martinez’s testimony in reaching the verdict, focusing instead on the
evidence provided by eyewitnesses to the crime. 29
This research illustrates that math avoidance can be a conscious
technique used by lawyers to develop a persuasive narrative that
avoids confusion or the misinterpretation of numerical evidence by
laypersons charged with legal decision making. But that is just the tip
of the iceberg with regard to math avoidance in the law: as other

26.

See, e.g., Leonard R. Jaffee, Prior Probability—A Black Hole in the
Mathematician’s View of the Sufficiency and Weight of Evidence, 9
Cardozo L. Rev. 967 (1988) (arguing ardently against the use of
probabilistic evidence); Richard O. Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75
Mich. L. Rev. 1021 (1977) (agreeing with Tribe as an initial matter
that the costs of using probabilistic evidence in the fact-finding process
at trial outweigh the benefits of such use); see also David McCord, A
Primer for the Nonmathematically Inclined on Mathematical Evidence
in Criminal Cases: People v. Collins and Beyond, 47 Wash. & Lee L.
Rev. 741 (1990) (providing an overview of the issues and arguments
concerning probabilistic evidence and the associated case law and social
science research).

27.

Panel on Statistics Assessments as Evidence in the Courts,
Nat’l Research Council, The Evolving Role of Statistical
Assessments as Evidence in the Courts 154 (Stephen E. Fienberg
ed., 1989).

28.

Michael J. Saks & Robert F. Kidd, Human Information Processing and
Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics, 15 Law & Soc’y Rev. 123, 149
(1980–1981).

29.

See Fisher, supra note 19, at 72.
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commentators have noted, lawyers often avoid math simply because
they are uncomfortable with it. 30
Avoidance, though, is not the primary problem. Instead, the
central issue is that when lawyers do math, 31 they often do it badly.
Indeed, the ways innumeracy manifests itself are so varied and
overlapping that any taxonomy of the problem is necessarily
incomplete. But it is worth parsing the types of numerical errors
lawyers most commonly make in order to better understand the
reasons for them and identify those that are most in need of systemic
correction. Three problems are of particular importance due to their
pervasiveness and the ways in which they compromise transparency in
the law and, thus, undermine the legitimacy of our legal system:
(1) persistent computational errors, (2) the reduction of complex
calculations to overly simplistic formulas that obscure their failure to
accomplish their intended goals, and (3) the production and use of
meaningless data through fundamental misunderstandings of the
principles underlying mathematical calculations.
A.

Innumeracy Through Miscalculation

Computational errors are the simplest of math mistakes: for
example, a figure is calculated incorrectly, numbers are transposed, or
addition is performed rather than multiplication. In many instances,
such errors are caught quickly, before they become of any significance.
However, when errors are not self-evident, a lawyer must be secure
enough with numbers to think critically about them so as to ensure
that an apparent result is in fact the actual result.
Sometimes individuals do not have the basic tools to think
critically about numbers. In his bestseller about the existence and
consequences of innumeracy, mathematics professor John Allen Paulos
catalogued Americans’ difficulties with identifying internal
inconsistencies in calculations because of difficulties with estimation
and scale. 32 For example, Paulos analyzes the story of Noah’s Ark

30.

For example, in an article for young practitioners, Scheherazade Fowler
comments on “lawyers who try really hard to not look too closely at
numbers, who accept the accountant’s numbers blindly, whose eyes
glaze over at spreadsheets and balance sheets.” Scheherazade Fowler,
Journal of a Young Lawyer, Law Prac. Today (Mar. 2005),
http://apps.americanbar.org/lpm/lpt/articles/mgt03054.html.

31.

In fact, in some instances math cannot be avoided as the substance of
the controversy is itself mathematical—for example, the calculation of
damages or the valuation of a company. Professor Tribe specifically
excepts such cases from his criticisms of the use of math at trial. Tribe,
supra note 14, at 1338.

32.

John Allen Paulos, Innumeracy: Mathematical Illiteracy and
Its Consequences 7–32 (paperback ed. 2001).
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from the Book of Genesis for mathematical possibility. 33 For water
deep enough to cover the world’s mountains, he calculates that at
least half a billion cubic miles of rain would need to fall in the allotted
forty-day period. 34 On an hourly basis, this is a rate of rainfall of at
least fifteen feet per hour, more than sufficient to sink an aircraft
carrier—or a fully-loaded ark. 35 Thus simple mathematical estimations
and calculations and a sense of scale—of what fifteen feet of rain an
hour looks like—clarifies that the story cannot be literally true.
As a more practical and legal example of this sort of problem,
Professor Allan Felsot has critiqued policymakers’ “inability to grasp
the magnitude of numbers” with respect to the level of contaminants
in the environment. 36 As such, lawmakers cannot distinguish between
levels that are biologically significant and those that are not, leading
them to impose completely impractical requirements for contaminant
management. 37 When lawyers fail to understand the context of
numbers, they lose the ability to think critically about them, and the
results can prove nonsensical.
Absent a sense of how numbers should work and an interest in
engaging with them, moreover, errors that should be easily correctable
often become legally significant. 38 Take, for example, the calculation
of the value of an interest in a family limited partnership (FLP) 39 for
gift and estate tax purposes. A common estate-planning tool, an FLP
transforms assets that were once wholly owned and freely transferable
by a taxpayer into interests in an illiquid company. 40 Since a buyer
33.

Id. at 16–17.

34.

Id.

35.

Id.

36.

Allan S. Felsot, Numbers, Numbers Everywhere—And Not a Drop of
Meaning, 13 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 91, 91 (1998).

37.

See id. at 92 (discussing how “regulatory standards have begun to
overreach the true significance of the numbers”).

38.

In fact, innumeracy of this sort is often behind malpractice actions
against attorneys. See Julie A. Goren, Getting the Date Right, Cal.
Law., Dec. 2010, at 39, 39 (reporting that the American Bar
Association has identified calendaring and deadline-related errors as a
leading cause of attorney malpractice actions including, among others,
miscounting the days until a deadline expired).

39.

Ostensibly referring only to “limited partnerships,” FLPs may in fact be
created as limited liability companies, business trusts, or other closelyheld business entities. While the details of the entity and capitalization
structure differ depending on the type of entity employed, the basic
technique and calculation of discounts are the same. As used in this
Article, “FLP” is a term of art independent of the entity type.

40.

See James R. Repetti, Minority Discounts: The Alchemy in Estate and
Gift Taxation, 50 Tax L. Rev. 415, 452–58 (1995) (containing a critical
discussion of the use of FLPs in estate planning).
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would pay less for such a restricted interest than for outright
ownership of the underlying assets, the successful use of an FLP
depresses the taxable value of the asset. 41 Thus, when a taxpayer
transfers interests in the FLP to his children or other intended
beneficiaries, he pays tax on the lower value of the FLP interest
rather than on the value of the assets he transferred to the FLP in
the first instance.
To illustrate this technique, consider the valuation of one share of
common stock that is traded on the New York Stock Exchange.
Because the stock is publicly traded, its tax valuation is
straightforward: simply find the mean of its high and low trading
values on the day in question. 42 Compare this value to that of an
interest in an FLP that holds shares of publicly traded stock. Because
the FLP interest is not regularly sold on any established market,
there is no high or low value to average. Instead, its value for tax
purposes is based on “all relevant factors,” including the FLP’s net
asset value and demonstrated earning capacity, the economic outlook
for its particular business, and the value of the securities of
comparable companies that are publicly traded. 43
If we assume the FLP interest being valued represents 10% of the
interests in the company, at first blush the value of the interest
should be worth 10% of the overall value of the FLP. But finding an
unrelated buyer for the interest at this price would most likely be
impossible: the buyer would have no guarantee of receiving any return
on his investment, could not determine the FLP’s investment or
dividend policy, and would not even be able to determine who would
manage the company’s investments. Moreover, finding a subsequent
buyer for the interest would prove difficult if the initial buyer decided
against holding the investment at some point in the future. As such, a
buyer would expect to pay something less than 10% of the FLP’s
overall value for the interest.
Thus, in most instances the value of an FLP interest must be
discounted from a proportionate portion of the FLP’s overall value.
Where the interest being valued represents less than a controlling
interest in the company, its value is often discounted to reflect its
41.

See Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2031-2(a), 25.2512-2(a) (as amended in 1992 and
1976, respectively) (establishing that the value of an interest for gift and
estate tax purposes is its fair market value on the valuation date).

42.

See Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2031-2(b)(1), 25.2512-2(b)(1) (as amended in 1992
and 1976, respectively) (establishing that the mean between the highest
and lowest selling price on the date of the gift is the fair market value
per share).

43.

Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2031-3, 25.2512-3(a) (as amended in 1992 and 1960,
respectively). See also Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2031-2(f), 25.2512-2(f) (as
amended in 1992 and 1976, respectively) (listing factors); Rev. Rul. 5960, 1959-1 C.B. 237 (same).
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holder’s lack of control. 44 Moreover, where the value of the company
was initially determined by comparison to publicly-traded companies
in a similar business, a discount accounting for the comparative
difficulty in selling the privately-held FLP interest is appropriate. 45 In
each case, the appropriate adjustment is generally determined by
appraisal.
Taken as a whole, the valuation of an interest in a company that
is not publicly traded involves a series of high-stakes judgment calls
that can substantially reduce the taxable value of a taxpayer’s
interest in a company, 46 and thus his tax burden. As a result, estateplanning attorneys are careful in their related documentation and
calculations. Yet miscalculations in this realm are legion.
The most common error reflected in the case law involves the
application of discounts for lack of control and lack of marketability
to the same underlying FLP value. As with any set of discounts, the
proper calculation involves a sequential application of the discounts. 47
For illustration, consider a $100 item that was initially marked down
by 30%, and then by a further 20%. Its final marked-down price can
be found by calculating the initial discount and subtracting this
amount from the initial price, then calculating the second discount on
this initial marked-down price and subtracting it from this
intermediate price. 48 Thus:
44.

This is often termed a “lack of control” or “minority” discount. See,
e.g., Estate of Kelley ex rel. Louden v. Comm’r, 90 T.C.M. (CCH) 369,
372 (2005) (“A minority discount will therefore apply . . . where a
partner lacks control.”). Alternatively, where the interest is a controlling
one, a “control interest premium” may be appropriate if the initial
valuation did not assume control. See Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2031-2(e),
25.2512-2(e) (as amended in 1992 and 1976, respectively) (“[I]f the block
of stock to be valued represents a controlling interest . . . the price at
which other lots change hands may have little relation to its true
value.”).

45.

This is commonly called a “discount for lack of marketability.” See
generally Mukesh Bajaj et al., Firm Value and Marketability Discounts,
27 J. Corp. L. 89, 100–03 (2001).

46.

See Louis A. Mezzullo, Valuation of Corporate Stock, 831-3d Tax Mgmt.
Portfolios (BNA), at B-101–02 (2010) (showing lack of control
discounts up to 35% and lack of marketability discounts of up to 50% in
a selection of 77 reported cases).

47.

See Gary R. Trugman, Understanding Business Valuation: A
Practical Guide to Valuing Small to Medium-Sized Businesses
286–87 (1998).

48.

Because of the commutative property, the answer is the same regardless
of the order in which the discounts are applied. Thus, a $100 item that
is first marked down by 20% and then by 30% yields the same final
marked-down price as one that is first marked down by 30% and then
by 20%.
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initial sales price
less initial discount
initial marked-down price
less second discount
final marked down price

($100 × 30%)
($70 × 20%)

$100
- $30
$70
- $14
$56

The resulting total mark-down in percentage terms is 44%. 49
Similarly, where a block of stock is appropriately subject to a 30%
lack of control discount and a 20% discount for lack of marketability,
its total applicable discount is the same 44%. Yet lawyers, judges, and
law students all frequently incorrectly calculate the overall discount.
In some instances, the discounts are added together to produce a total
applicable discount of 50%. 50 In others, the final marked-down price
and discount are transposed; thus the taxable value is reported as $44
instead of $56. 51 In still others, the discounts are combined in a way
that defies explanation and thus is only attributable to a
miscalculation. 52
Each of these mistakes is easy to catch and correct for an
attorney comfortable with numbers and their calculation. For
example, when one recognizes that discounts are multiplicative rather
than additive, even a quick review should reveal that discounts of
30% and 20% cannot yield an overall discount of 50%. Yet these sorts
of errors may well evade notice by lawyers unaccustomed to

49.

This is calculated as: $100 initial price − $56 final price = $44 total
discount. The percentage discount is: $44 total discount = 0.44 = 44%.

50.

See, e.g., Estate of Bailey ex rel. Foster v. Comm’r, 83 T.C.M. (CCH)
1862 (2002) (claiming incorrectly that discounts of 20% and 40% yielded
an overall discount of 60%); Estate of Barudin ex rel. Clarke v. Comm’r,
72 T.C.M. (CCH) 488 (1996) (asserting that discounts of 26% and 19%
yielded a total discount of 45%); cf. Dickerson v. Comm’r, 103 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1280 (2012) (erroneously discounting the valuation of the gift of
lottery proceeds made by the taxpayer by a total of 67%, based on
individual discounts of 65% and 2%).

51.

Cf. Repetti, supra note 40, at 425 (“A few confused courts initially
valued the corporation assuming control and then added a control
premium to the controlling block, in effect, double counting for the
premium.” (footnote omitted)).

52.

For example, in Estate of Kelley ex rel. Louden v. Commissioner, 90
T.C.M. (CCH) 369, 370 (2005), the taxpayers claimed discounts of 38%
for lack of marketability and of 25% for lack of control. Without
explanation, their counsel repeatedly asserted that these discounts
together produced a total discount of 55.15%. Id. at 370 n.1. As the
court noted, this assertion contradicted the actual total discount—
53.5%—correctly applied by the appraiser in calculating the taxable
value of the interest. Id. Ultimately, the court correctly applied the
adjusted discounts it allowed. Id. at 373–74.
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estimating and thinking critically about numbers, causing serious
harm to their clients. 53
B.

Innumeracy Through Oversimplification

Complex numerical ideas frequently defy simplification. This has
not, however, prevented lawyers and lawmakers from seeking to
express complex mathematical concepts in simple terms, even when
the result makes no economic sense.
One example of an oversimplified formula is that for the division
of equity in homes that are classified as hybrid property upon a
couple’s divorce. 54 “Hybrid property” is property owned by a couple
that has both separate and marital components, 55 often because of its
acquisition with a combination of premarital and postmarriage funds.
Homes that are purchased prior to marriage, with later mortgage
payments made with income earned during the marriage, epitomize
hybrid property.
In determining how much of a hybrid-property home’s equity
should be allocated to one spouse’s separate estate and how much to
the marital estate upon divorce, many courts look to the “source of the
53.

The result of these mistakes might be the overpayment of tax or the
imposition of penalties and interest for an underpayment. In either case,
the mistake can trigger an audit—with the associated emotional and legal
costs. See infra notes 118–21 and accompanying text for further discussion
of these issues. Even where caught by an attorney, there can be negative
repercussions for clients. See, e.g., DeCurtins v. DeCurtins, Nos. 92 CA 2,
92 CA 44, 1993 WL 211348, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. June 16, 1993)
(correcting defendant’s attorney’s simple $19,500 miscalculation in a
property settlement agreement only after several years of appeals).

54.

For further examples of oversimplification in the law in response to
mathematical complexity, see F. Russell Denton & Paul J. Heald,
Random Walks, Non-Cooperative Games, and the Complex Mathematics
of Patent Pricing, 55 Rutgers L. Rev. 1175, 1181–93 (2003)
(analyzing the prevailing patent-valuation methods and finding them
overly simplistic), and A New Formula for Divorce, with Uneven Results,
Wall St. J. (Mar. 11, 2012, 10:30 PM), http://live.wsj.com/video/
EBE6C620-C3DA-4EFC-AF7C-F6702B34EA6B.html (featuring Judge
Sondra Miller (retired) of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court
of New York criticizing the state’s statutory formula for setting
predivorce alimony and explaining that the formula, through
oversimplification, produces perverse and unexpected consequences when
applied to certain more affluent couples). Cf. Meyerson & Meyerson,
supra note 17 (critiquing the initial presumption in paternity cases that,
prior to testing, the defendant has a 50% chance of being the father; the
focus on race in DNA matching, regardless of its relevance to the crime
committed; and the reduction of damages to plaintiffs who are women
or members of a racial minority group).

55.

Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and
Recommendations § 4.03 (2002); 1 Brett R. Turner, Equitable
Distribution of Property § 5:28 (3d ed. 2005).
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funds” used to acquire equity in the property.56 They then divide that
equity between the estates based on their contributions. 57 The ultimate
goal is to return the invested funds to the estate that provided them,
along with a return that fairly allocates the appreciation in the home’s
value during the time it was owned by the couple. 58
The most often-used formula for this division is expressed
algebraically as:
nmc/tc × e = nonmarital property, 59

where nmc is the total of the nonmarital (separate) contributions to
the home’s equity, 60 tc is the total amount contributed by both the
separate and marital estates, and e is the home’s net equity at the
time the marriage is dissolved. 61 After calculating the separate estate’s
share of the equity pursuant to this formula, all remaining equity is
allocated to the marital estate.

56.

See Brett R. Turner, Virginia’s Equitable Distribution Law: Active
Appreciation and the Source of Funds Rule, 47 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
879, 890 (1990).

57.

See id. (“[W]hen property is acquired with marital and separate funds,
the ratio between the marital and separate interests is the ratio between
the marital and separate contributions.”).

58.

See, e.g., Maddox v. Maddox, 604 S.E.2d 784, 786 (Ga. 2004)
(expressing that each estate should receive a fair and proportionate
return on its investment in the home); Hall v. Hall, 462 A.2d 1179, 1181
(Me. 1983) (same); Hoffman v. Hoffman, 614 A.2d 988, 993 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1992) (same); In re Marriage of Herr, 705 S.W.2d 619, 624
(Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (same); Wade v. Wade, 325 S.E.2d 260, 269 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1985) (same); Smoot v. Smoot, 4 Va. Cir. 182, 190 (Va. Cir.
Ct. 1984) (same).

59.

The court in Brandenburg v. Brandenburg, 617 S.W.2d 871, 872–74 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1981), explicated this formula. Georgia, Missouri, Virginia, and
West Virginia have also adopted it. Snowden v. Alexander-Snowden,
587 S.E.2d 54, 55–56 (Ga. 2003); In re Herr, 705 S.W.2d at 625; Hart v.
Hart, 497 S.E.2d 496, 505 (Va. Ct. App. 1998); Whiting v. Whiting, 396
S.E.2d 413, 422 (W. Va. 1990).

60.

Nonmarital contributions are the equity in the home at the time of
marriage together with any later payments from separate funds towards
the mortgage principal and the value of any improvements made to the
home that were paid from separate funds. “Marital contributions” equal
amounts paid after marriage to reduce the mortgage principal and the
value of any improvements made to the property after marriage, in each
case paid for from funds that are not one spouse’s separate property.
See Brandenburg, 617 S.W.2d at 872 (providing definitions for the terms
in the formula).

61.

Dissolution can either be the time of separation or divorce, depending on
state law. If the home is sold prior to that time, e equals the net
proceeds from the sale. See id.
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Consider, for example, a $250,000 home purchased by an
unmarried individual using conventional financing. 62 At purchase, the
downpayment is $50,000 and the mortgage balance is $200,000.
Assuming the homeowner pays $5,000 of the principal of the loan
prior to marriage two years later 63 and the value of the home stays
constant, the homeowner’s nonmarital contributions (nmc) total
$55,000. 64 If the couple makes mortgage principal payments of $20,000
during their six year marriage, as well as an additional lump sum
payment of $35,000 near the end of the marriage, the total
contributions (tc) to the home’s equity equals $110,000. 65 If the home
appreciates to be worth $500,000 at the time of divorce, its net equity
(e) at that time is $360,000. 66
Using the above formula, the value allocated to the separate
estate is:
($55,000/$110,000) × $360,000 = $180,000.

The remaining home equity—$180,000 67—is allocated to the marital
estate. This makes intuitive sense, since each estate contributed an
equal amount to the home’s equity and thus should receive an equal
portion of the available equity.
Yet it makes no economic sense. Each estate’s interest is
misvalued under the formula because it allocates an identical return
62.

The conventional financing for a home purchase is provided by a 20%
down payment and a 30-year fully amortized mortgage. See Matthew
Chambers et al., Accounting for Changes in the Homeownership Rate,
50 Int’l Econ. Rev. 677, 700–01 (2009).

63.

This is the typical total of the principal payments in the first two years
of a conventional mortgage with a 6.5% interest rate. See Lisa Milot,
Accounting for Time: A Relative-Interest Approach to the Division of
Equity in Hybrid-Property Homes Upon Divorce, 100 Ky. L.J. 585, 607–
09 (2011–2012) (providing a more in-depth example and explanation of
the components of and variations to the formula).

64.

This amount consists of the $50,000 down payment and $5,000 principal
payments.

65.

$55,000 (nmc) + $20,000 (scheduled marital principal payments) +
$35,000 (lump-sum marital principal payment) = $110,000.

66.

The net equity equals the home’s value less the outstanding mortgage.
The original $200,000 mortgage has been reduced by the $5,000
principal payment prior to marriage, the $20,000 monthly payments
during the marriage, and the $35,000 lump sum payment, so $140,000 is
outstanding at the time the marriage dissolves. Thus,
e = $500,000 – $140,000
= $360,000.

67.

Net equity (e) – nonmarital property = marital property, or
$360,000 – $180,000 = $180,000.
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to each estate even though the separate contributions were made
many years before the marital contributions. In effect, the formula
simply operates as though each estate held an equal 50% interest in
the home from the moment of marriage forward. A truly
“proportionate” allocation of the appreciation would have to account
for the greater investment timeframe of the separate interest.
The formula also ignores the fact that changes in a home’s value
are not smooth. While our hypothetical home, for example, doubled in
value between its owners’ marriage and divorce, this growth did not
occur in 72 equal monthly increments. Instead, in some months it was
greater and in some months it was less—or may even have been a
loss. A “fair” allocation of the appreciation would allocate the periodic
gain (or loss) between the estates each time their relative interests in
the property changed.
The current formula is straightforward, intuitive, and easy to
apply. Because it values the home only at marriage and divorce, it
requires little record-keeping and only a few very simple calculations.
Yet the cost of this simplicity is a substantial transfer of wealth
between the separate and marital estates. This transfer, moreover, is
invisible and unacknowledged. While courts and legislatures are free
to knowingly choose this outcome, there is no indication they have
done so in adopting this formula. From all appearances, courts have
simply assumed that the existing formula produces an economically
sound allocation of appreciation, and lawyers have uncritically applied
it. Put simply, legal innumeracy has produced a formula that
sacrifices fairness and accuracy for simplicity. And, notwithstanding
the formula’s widespread use over more than thirty years, this fact
has gone largely unrecognized. 68
C.

Innumeracy Through Misunderstanding

A final form of innumeracy involves a problem at the heart of
innumeracy in the law: many lawyers misunderstand fundamental
mathematical principles. 69 In other words, mistakes in calculations
68.

This oversimplification is the central problem addressed in my most
recent article. Milot, supra note 63, at 618–23; cf. William A. Reppy,
Jr., Apportioning Business Profits Generated by Spousal Labor and
Capital Owned Over Time by Shifting Fractional Shares of the Separate
and Community/Marital Estates, 31 Fam. L.Q. 63 (1997) (making an
analogous critique of the law concerning hybrid-property businesses).

69.

One manifestation of this misunderstanding is the misuse of numerical
terms. For example, a recent student note states that the author is
“saddled with massive debt,” but in the next sentence refers to the
author’s three-digit net worth, seemingly without awareness that this
formulation means that the author has assets with a value even greater
than his “massive debt.” See Joshua Plager, Note, Trim, Plan, Law
School: We Have a Situation (Now Let’s Fix It), 67 U. Miami L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2013).
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reflect a deeper lack of comprehension about how numbers work. This
problem is well documented in legal writings: both courts 70 and
commentators, 71 for example, have often criticized lawyers for misunderstanding statistical evidence.
One troublesome example involves the use of faulty probabilistic
evidence to establish a defendant’s guilt or innocence in a criminal case.
In Collins, for example, the court was not only concerned with the
power of math to bewitch the jury. 72 It also criticized the prosecutor’s
misapplication of statistical principles that led to the production of
erroneous and ultimately meaningless probabilistic evidence.
At trial, the defendant, Malcolm Collins, had been convicted of
second-degree robbery based largely on probabilistic evidence. The
prosecutor had proposed probabilities for the occurrence of each of six
factors to establish an extremely high likelihood that Mr. Collins had
assisted his wife Janet 73 in stealing a purse. 74 Based on these
probabilities, the prosecutor argued that there was only 1 chance in
12 million that the defendant could be innocent.
In reviewing Mr. Collins’s case on appeal, the California Supreme
Court sharply criticized the prosecutor’s misuse of statistics. Instead
of being based on statistical (or, really, any) research, the probability
factor for each of the characteristics was merely a guess. 75 Moreover,
70.

See, e.g., Branion v. Gramly, 855 F.2d 1256, 1263–66 (7th Cir. 1988)
(claiming that “people must be sure of what they are looking for, and
how they can prove it, before they start fooling with algebra” before
asserting that the defendant’s lawyers failed at the task of analyzing the
probabilities and statistics); People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33, 38–42 (Cal.
1968) (en banc) (finding that the prosecutor’s use of probability
statistics was improper since the testimony lacked foundation in
statistical theory and evidence).

71.

See, e.g., Aaron Taggart & Wayne Blackmon, Statistical Base and
Background Rates: The Silent Issue Not Addressed in Massachusetts v.
EPA, 7 Law, Probability & Risk 275, 276 (2008) (“The ability to use
statistical base rates is necessary for a competent argument and ruling
in a vast number of cases, yet the problem is seemingly addressed
without cognizance of the frequency with which the challenge arises.”);
Tribe, supra note 14, at 1334–38 (criticizing the use of statistical
evidence in Collins).

72.

See supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text (discussing the court’s
concern with the effect of statistical evidence on the jury).

73.

Mrs. Collins did not appeal her conviction. Collins, 438 P.2d at 33. As a
result, this analysis focuses only on the use of probabilistic evidence with
respect to Mr. Collins.

74.

The factors and probabilities asserted were: a partly yellow automobile
(1∕10), a man with a mustache (¼), a girl with a ponytail (1∕10), a girl with
blond hair (1∕3), an African-American man with a beard (1∕10), and an
interracial couple in a car (1∕1000). Id. at 37 n.10.

75.

In fact, the prosecutor even invited the jurors to substitute their own
guesses for his. Id. at 38.
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the prosecutor’s treatment of the six factors as mutually
independent—and thus properly multiplied together to find their
collective probability 76—was a “glaring defect” since it was clearly
untrue. For example, the sets of girls with blond hair and of those
with ponytails are obviously partly overlapping, as are the sets of
African-American men with a beard and of men with a mustache.77
To multiply the probabilities, as the prosecution had done,
“inevitably yield[s] a wholly erroneous and exaggerated result even if
all of the individual components had been determined with
precision.” 78 The court held that the prosecutor’s misapplication of
fundamental statistical principles constituted a miscarriage of justice
and overturned Mr. Collins’s conviction on that ground.
Despite the scathing critiques of the misuse of probabilistic
evidence in Collins, this form of innumeracy has proven tenacious.
Twenty years later, Judge Frank Easterbrook confronted the flipside
of the Collins issue: whether proffered statistical evidence was
sufficient to establish that a defendant’s guilt was too improbable for
conviction as a matter of law. 79 And again, the court held that
counsel had misused statistical principles, rendering the resulting
probabilistic evidence untrustworthy.
In the case before Judge Easterbrook, Branion v. Gramly, Dr.
John Branion Jr. was appealing his conviction for the murder of his
wife, Donna. 80 He had been convicted based on circumstantial
76.

This is the “product rule” or “multiplication rule.” Id. at 39 (citing
Note, Evidence: Admission of Mathematical Probability Statistics Held
Erroneous for Want of Demonstration of Validity, 1967 Duke L.J. 665,
669 n.25).

77.

Id.

78.

Id.

79.

Branion v. Gramly, 855 F.2d 1256, 1261–64 (7th Cir. 1988). Similarly,
at O.J. Simpson’s trial for the murder of his ex-wife, law professor Alan
Dershowitz testified that there was only a 0.04% chance that Mr.
Simpson had killed his ex-wife. D. Kim Rossmo, Failures in Criminal
Investigations, Police Chief, Oct. 2009, at 54, 62. But the statistics to
which Professor Dershowitz testified were in fact only relevant as to the
probability that Nicole Simpson would be killed by her ex-husband
based solely on the evidence that he had battered her. Id. at 61–62. The
more relevant statistic, which was not disclosed at trial, was that the
likelihood that a battered woman’s abuser was her killer once she was,
in fact, killed, was almost 90%. Id. at 62. In whole numbers, this
represents the difference between a 9-in-22,500 chance and a 9-in-10
chance.

80.

Branion, 855 F.2d at 1258–59. Mrs. Branion had been strangled and
shot at least four times in her apartment. There was no evidence she
had been molested, that the apartment had been forcibly entered, or
that anything had been stolen. She was found by her husband who,
despite being a physician, did not assist her. The murder weapon was a
rare type of gun that Dr. Branion, a gun collector, owned. When asked
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evidence and appealed to the Seventh Circuit, claiming that it was
impossible for him to have killed her because the murder simply took
more time than he had available. 81 In support of this position, Dr.
Branion’s lawyers asserted that the probability that he could have
committed the murder was less than 0.0001% based on individual
probabilities of less than 0.01% for each of two timing factors: the
drive time between the hospital at which Dr. Branion worked that
day and the apartment where the murder occurred and the length of
time it takes for bruises like those on Mrs. Branion’s neck to form. 82
The court acknowledged the importance of statistical evidence as
a general matter, but objected to the specific use by the defendant’s
lawyers, finding that they had misunderstood how to produce a
meaningful calculation of probabilities. 83 Indeed, as in Collins, the
probabilities asserted by the defendant’s lawyers were based on
ungrounded or faulty assumptions with no actual data collection. 84
Moreover, the court expressed disbelief that the defendant’s lawyers
“simply multiplied two small numbers to get a smaller one, without
to produce it by the police, though, Dr. Branion gave them a different
gun; his gun that matched the description of the murder weapon was
never produced. Four shell casings matching the type located in the
couple’s locked gun cabinet were found next to Mrs. Branion’s body.
Shortly after Mrs. Branion’s murder, Dr. Branion married his mistress.
In the words of the court, “The evidence was circumstantial, but what
circumstances!” Id. at 1258. Indeed, the noteworthy circumstances were
not limited to the facts of the murder: the judge at Dr. Branion’s trial
might have tried to solicit bribes in return for overturning the jury’s
verdict, the prosecutor engaged in ex parte communications with the
judge, and, at the end of the trial, Dr. Branion fled to Africa, where he
became Idi Amin’s personal physician for several years prior to being
returned to the United States upon regime change and appealing his
conviction. Id. at 1258–59.
81.

Id. at 1261–63.

82.

Id. at 1263.

83.

Id. at 1263–65. Cf. People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33, 33 (Cal. 1968) (en
banc) (“While we discern no inherent incompatibility between the
disciplines of law and mathematics and intend no general disapproval or
disparagement of the latter as an auxiliary in the fact-finding processes
of the former, we cannot uphold the technique employed in the instant
case.”).

84.

Moreover, the court noted that, even without these misconceptions, the
defense attorneys simply miscalculated the probability that the drive
time could have been as needed for Dr. Branion to have committed the
murder. Branion, 855 F.2d at 1265. Instead of being a probability of
0.01% based on the assumption that it was three standard deviations
from the mean, the court asserted that the probability was actually
0.1%. Id. In fact, a few more than 99.7% of all outcomes will fall within
three standard deviations in a normal curve; so the actual probability is
just under 0.15%.
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describing why these were plausible numbers or why we ought to
multiply them.” 85 Ultimately the court found the lawyers’ arguments
unpersuasive because they lacked a sound statistical basis.
At issue in both Collins and Branion was a fundamental
misunderstanding by attorneys about the principles of mathematical
probability. Instead of collecting and analyzing data through the use
of statistical tools, the lawyers invented data and multiplied the
resulting figures to produce probabilities favorable to their legal
positions. As a result, the numbers standing in for evidence in each
case were unmoored from meaning. For the lawyers, though, the very
mystique of the numbers provided sufficient evidence to paint a
picture about the defendant’s guilt or innocence. But such efforts do
not involve a proper use of mathematics. As noted by the Branion
court, the sound assessment of probabilities “can be a daunting
task.” 86 When lawyers fail to understand background mathematical
principles, the task becomes impossible.
Not all lawyers are bad at math. And not all instances of “bad
math” involve innumeracy. Often, however, the difficulty lawyers
have with selecting, presenting, calculating, analyzing, and critiquing
numbers is a product of innumeracy and bears consequences for our
ability to fully represent our clients.

II. The Significance of Legal Innumeracy
Despite our often profound discomfort with numbers, for many
lawyers numerical analysis is a part of the everyday practice of law.
Mathematical data illuminating legal issues are pervasive; in fact,
“[m]uch of the evidence we think of as most reliable is just a
compendium of statistical inferences.” 87 Thus, proof of causation in
toxic torts litigation often relies on statistically based epidemiological
proof, 88 and statistical evidence showing disparate hiring practices
85.

Id.

86.

Id. at 1264.

87.

Id.

88.

United States v. Shonubi, 895 F. Supp. 460, 517 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing
Steve Gold, Causation in Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof, Standards of
Persuasion, and Statistical Evidence, 96 Yale L.J. 376, 377 (1986)),
vacated, 103 F.3d 1085 (2d Cir. 1997); see also David L. Faigman et
al., Science in the Law: Standards, Statistics and Research
Issues § 7-1.1 (2002) (noting the importance of statistical evidence in
mass tort litigation). Where such statistical evidence is absent, plaintiffs
are often unsuccessful in obtaining relief, particularly in cases that do
not involve a signature disease or in which the disease in question does
not manifest itself immediately. Shonubi, 895 F. Supp. at 517 (citing
Joseph Sanders, From Science to Evidence: The Testimony on
Causation in the Bendectin Cases, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 14–18 (1993)).
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based on an applicant’s race or sex is often critical to establishing
employment discrimination. 89 Antitrust litigation includes evidence
based on regression analysis, 90 and trial attorneys use the discounted
value of lost future earnings to calculate damages in personal injury
lawsuits. 91 Indeed, the formula chosen to calculate individual investors’
gains and losses will determine the winners and losers of billions of
dollars in cases such as that involving the misdeeds of Bernie Madoff.92
In other contexts, mathematical analysis plays a supporting role.
Judge Learned Hand famously expressed the standard of care that
defines negligence in tort law algebraically, 93 although at trial this
analysis is at most a background defense to forestall juries from
punishing defendants for the cold quantification of lives and pain the
formula embodies. 94 More recently, courts have extended this formula
89.

See, e.g., Christine E. Webber, A Plaintiff’s Perspective on Some
Evidentiary Issues and Jury Instructions in Employment Discrimination
Litigation, in Evidence Issues and Jury Instructions in
Employment Cases 169, 173–74 (ALI-ABA Course of Study 2007)
(stating that “[s]tatistical evidence showing a pattern of conduct by an
employer is considered evidence of pretext in an individual case,” and
explaining that “[c]ourts have often held that mere numerical evidence is
insufficient to prove a prima facie case, and must be subjected to
analysis including comparison to the available labor pool to be
admitted”); see also Shonubi, 895 F. Supp. at 517) (noting the centrality
of statistical evidence in employment discrimination cases).

90.

See Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Econometrics in the Courtroom, 85 Colum. L.
Rev. 1048, 1048 n.4 (1985) (providing examples of cases that discuss the
use of regression analysis and statistical techniques in antitrust
litigation).

91.

See Tribe, supra note 14, at 1338 n.29 (listing cases focusing on
calculations of the plaintiffs’ expected lifetime earnings).

92.

See Ken Belson & Alison Leigh Cowan, Mets Owners Hope Courts Will
Limit Liability, N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 2011, at B12 (describing the
possible formulas for recovering and allocating invested funds).

93.

United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947)
(“Possibly it serves to bring this notion into relief to state it in algebraic
terms: if the probability [of injury] be called P; the injury, L; and the
burden [of preventing the injury], B; liability depends upon whether B is
less than L multiplied by P: i. e., whether B < PL.”).

94.

See, e.g., Raeder, supra note 1, at 1590 (“Who among us would not find
it a true challenge to defend a corporation, in a case involving serious
personal injury or death, by telling the jury that a cost-benefit analysis
of the missing safety device demonstrated its economic infeasibility?”);
see also Stephen G. Gilles, On Determining Negligence: Hand Formula
Balancing, the Reasonable Person Standard, and the Jury, 54 Vand. L.
Rev. 813, 839 (2001) (noting that one limitation on the use of the
Hand Formula is jurors’ “tendencies to be swayed by sympathy for the
victim, by hindsight, and by the pull of strict liability intuitions”);
Michael D. Green, Negligence = Economic Efficiency: Doubts >, 75
Tex. L. Rev. 1605, 1640–42 (1997) (discussing the aftermath of
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to help decide issues as disparate as whether governmental action was
reckless, whether there was probable cause for a warrantless search,
and whether there was sufficient evidence to allow a preliminary
injunction. 95 Probabilistic proof based on genetic markers is prevalent,
but not alone determinative, in paternity litigation and many criminal
prosecutions. 96
Outside of the courtroom, some legal practices are explicitly
predicated on numerical analysis. Estate planning attorneys calculate
intestate and elective shares. 97 Environmental regulators rely on
statistically based risk assessments in defining acceptable levels of
pollutants, 98 as do drug regulators evaluating permissible side effects
of new medications. 99 Family law attorneys calculate child support
and assist in the division of property between divorcing spouses,100
always with an eye to statutory formulas and the tax consequences of
the arrangements they negotiate. Transactional attorneys draft

Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Ct. App. 1981), in
which Ford was publicly castigated for a report, unused at trial, that
showed that the cost of design changes to prevent 180 burn deaths was
not economically sensible, and stating that because of such sensibilities,
trial lawyers cannot practically, and do not, defend negligence suits by
pointing to the economic rationality of not preventing the harm in
question).
95.

Barbara Ann White, Risk-Utility Analysis and the Learned Hand
Formula: A Hand that Helps or a Hand that Hides?, 32 Ariz. L. Rev.
77, 79 (1990). But see Richard W. Wright, Hand, Posner, and the Myth
of the “Hand Formula”, 4 Theoretical Inquiries L. 1, 4 (2003)
(stating that the Hand formula is “infrequently mentioned by the
courts, almost never included in jury instructions, rarely actually
employed in judicial opinions, and almost never explains the actual
results reached by the courts”).

96.

See, e.g., Branion v. Gramly, 855 F.2d 1256, 1263–66 (7th Cir. 1988)
(critiquing the use of probabilistic evidence in a criminal trial); William
C. Thompson & Rachel Dioso-Villa, Turning a Blind Eye to Misleading
Scientific Testimony: Failure of Procedural Safeguards in a Capital
Case, 18 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 151, 155–69 (2008) (same).

97.

See supra notes 39–49 and accompanying text (discussing the
calculation of the value of an interest in an FLP for estate planning
purposes).

98.

See Faigman, supra note 88, § 8-1.1 (discussing the use of hazard
identification, dose-response estimation, exposure assessment, and risk
characterization for environmental hazards).

99.

See id. (“Toxicological evidence plays a central role in the regulation of
drugs . . . .”).

100. See, e.g., Wall St. J., supra note 54 (discussing New York’s formula
for temporary spousal support); supra notes 54–68 and accompanying
text (analyzing the dominant formula for dividing the equity in hybridproperty homes on divorce).
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antidilution formulas and calculate stock exchange ratios. 101 The
valuation of intellectual property is one of the higher-stakes and
ofttimes more contentious issues in many mergers and acquisitions.102
And the list could go on. 103
Moreover, the importance of numerical understanding in the law is
growing. Oliver Wendell Holmes declared more than 100 years ago that
“[f]or the rational study of law the black-letter man may be the man of
the present, but the man of the future is the man of statistics and the
master of economics.” 104 Time has proven Justice Holmes prescient. In
the 1960s there were fewer than 600 federal district court opinions that
included the terms “statistic,” “statistics,” or “statistical.” 105 In striking
contrast, by the 1990s there were nearly ten times as many such
opinions,106 and this count more than tripled again in the last ten years,
101. See Michael A. Woronoff, Teaching Numeracy, 12 Transactions:
Tenn. J. Bus. L. (Special Report) 243, 253 (2011) (including a
nonexhaustive list of fourteen tasks commonly performed by
transactional lawyers that require numeracy).
102. See Ted Hagelin, Valuation of Intellectual Property Assets: An
Overview, 52 Syracuse L. Rev. 1133, 1133–40 (2002) (reviewing the
three basic valuation methods, discussing the valuation methods
developed for intellectual property, and presenting a new valuation
method); see also Charles R. McManis, Intellectual Property and
International Mergers and Acquisitions, 66 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1283, 1309–
14 (1998) (explaining the net present value approach to intellectual
property valuation).
103. And it does. For additional examples, see Faigman, supra note 88, §§ 51.1 to -1.3 (describing the use of statistical assessments in antitrust,
voting rights, employment discrimination, psychological tests, and DNA
fingerprinting); Meyerson & Meyerson, supra note 17, at 772 (“Statistics
are regularly used to prove or disprove issues as diverse as causation of
injuries in toxic torts cases, breach of contracts, discrimination in
employment and voting, DNA identification in criminal and family law,
trademark and patent violations, environmental harm, securities fraud,
and loss of future earnings.”); Tribe, supra note 14, at 1338 (noting that
use of mathematical techniques at trial is required where “the governing
substantive law makes a controversy turn on such questions as
percentage of market control, expected lifetime earnings, likelihood of
widespread public confusion, or the randomness of a jury selection
process” (footnotes omitted)).
104. O. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 469 (1897).
105. A Westlaw search shows 596 federal district court cases mentioning at
least one of these terms from January 1, 1960 through December 31, 1969.
106. A similar search returns 5,937 hits for January 1, 1990 through
December 31, 1999. This approach was suggested by the court in United
States v. Shonubi, 895 F. Supp. 460, 514 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), which found
around half as many cases using a LEXIS search through July 31, 1995.
Cf. Rubinfeld, supra note 90, at 1048 (discussing the increasing
importance of econometrics in litigation).
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with almost 19,000 such opinions issued.107 While these numbers offer
only a crude measure of the increasing importance of numerical analysis
in litigation, they point to the significance to the legal profession of
understanding and appropriately referencing numerical concepts, at
least in federal cases. Indeed, the even more recent explosion of
technological innovations, such as smart phones, tablet computers, and
cloud computing further increases the significance of numerical
confidence and competence in the law. Locating, understanding, and
analyzing the associated metadata produced in electronic discovery
requires experts—legal and otherwise—who are comfortable with
information technology and statistical calculations to make sense of the
resulting deluge of data.
While the extent to which numerical understanding is important
in the practice of law has increased in recent years, innumeracy in the
law is not itself a new problem. Self-deprecating references and jokes
about lawyers’ incompetence with math have been around for
generations, as have well-documented manifestations of innumeracy:
Collins was decided in 1968; 108 Professor Tribe critiqued the use of
probabilistic proof in criminal cases in 1971; 109 Brandenburg was
decided in 1981; 110 and Branion is from almost a quarter century
ago. 111 Despite its acknowledged difficulties with numbers, the legal
profession has flourished. Ultimately, does it matter if lawyers are bad
at math?
Many mathematical errors that lawyers make are corrected before
they do harm. In Estate of Kelley, the court noted that the taxpayer’s
counsel incorrectly discounted the value of the FLP’s assets in
determining the tax due on the transfer of its interests but the court
correctly combined the discounts it determined in its own
calculations. 112 The California Supreme Court reversed Mr. Collins’s
107. A search of the period January 1, 2002 through December 31, 2011
returns 18,988 cases.
108. People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33 (Cal. 1968) (en banc) (overturning the
defendant’s conviction because of the misuse of probabilistic evidence);
see also supra notes 18–20, 72–78 and accompanying text (discussing
Collins).
109. See Tribe, supra note 14, at 1358–77 (detailing the costs of using
probabilistic proof in the fact-finding process of a legal trial).
110. Brandenburg v. Brandenburg, 617 S.W.2d 871, 872 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981)
(setting forth the current formula for the division of equity in hybridproperty homes); see also supra notes 54–68 and accompanying text
(discussing Brandenburg).
111. Branion v. Gramly, 855 F.2d 1256, 1263–66 (7th Cir. 1988) (rejecting
the defendant’s appeal that relied on faulty probabilistic evidence); see
also supra notes 79–87 and accompanying text (discussing Branion).
112. Estate of Kelley ex rel. Louden v. Comm’r, 90 T.C.M. (CCH) 369
(2005); see supra note 52 (explaining the error in Kelley).
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conviction despite his own counsel’s inability to show why the
probabilistic evidence offered at trial was problematic. 113 The Seventh
Circuit deftly waded through the probabilistic evidence with which
Dr. Branion’s counsel presented it, rejecting the argument that
statistics compelled the jury to acquit. 114 In each case, the mathematical errors of attorneys were discovered and corrected by more
numerate courts.
In other instances, the cost of the error is so low that innumeracy
may prove to be an efficient outcome. For example, while the
dominant formula for dividing the equity in hybrid-property homes
upon divorce produces an invisible and systemic transfer of wealth
between the separate and marital estates, in any given divorce the
total sum in question may be relatively low—thousands of dollars, at
most—and there are costs to a more accurate division: time invested,
information required, and expert assistance procured. 115 The total cost
of preventing the errors by addressing the innumeracy of lawyers may
be higher than the total cost of allowing them.
Even so, efficiency concerns clearly do not explain or justify many
instances of innumeracy in the law. A less numerate court than the
Seventh Circuit might well have accepted Dr. Branion’s probabilistic
proof and released him despite the jury verdict of guilty. Malcolm
Collins’s conviction was overturned but that of his wife was not, 116 even
though both convictions were based on the same probabilistic evidence.
Mathematical errors, moreover, can prove extremely costly. Many
FLPs have net asset values in the tens—or even hundreds—of
millions of dollars. 117 Miscalculating the value of an interest by even a
few percentage points can change a taxpayer’s liability by millions of
dollars. 118 While these sorts of errors would generally be resolved on
audit if caught by the Internal Revenue Service, in cases where it
113. Collins, 438 P.2d at 41–42; see supra notes 72–86 and accompanying
text.
114. Branion, 855 F.2d at 1263–66; see supra notes 79–86 and accompanying
text.
115. See supra notes 55–66 and accompanying text.
116. Collins, 438 P.2d at 33.
117. See, e.g., Estate of Schutt ex rel. Schutt v. Comm’r, 89 T.C.M. (CCH)
1353, 1362 (2005) (valuing the FLPs in question at a combined total of
$93,778,121); Estate of Bongard ex rel. Bernards v. Comm’r, 124 T.C.
95, 132 (2005) (underlying value of FLP assets was $158,259,261);
Estate of Strangi ex rel. Gulig v. Comm’r, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1331, 1335
(2003) (“The total value of the property held by [the FLP] as of the
date of death was $11,100,922 . . . .”).
118. As of 2013, the maximum gift and estate tax rate is 40% and applies to
assets over $5,250,000 that a taxpayer gratuitously transfers in a taxable
transaction. American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112240, § 101, 126 Stat. 2313 (2013).
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results in the overvaluation of a taxpayer’s interest in an FLP—and
thus an overpayment of transfer tax—that is unlikely to occur. 119 In
addition, audit itself bears financial (and often psychological) costs for
clients. Even when the ultimate tax burden is reduced, in some
instances the client’s overall bill is increased due to additional
accounting and attorneys’ fees, and for many clients the stress of an
audit itself is a cost not to be assumed lightly. 120 Finally, in many
instances the transfer of FLP interests is designed to exactly equal the
amount a taxpayer may transfer each year without being subject to
gift tax. 121 Where the value of an FLP interest that is the subject of
such a gift is initially understated, the later correction on audit may
cause the value of the gift to exceed this annual limit. Thus, the
excess value is subject to gift tax despite the taxpayer’s effort to limit
the size of the gift to one without tax consequence.
There is a broader point, too. Innumeracy in the law matters even
when specific miscalculations, oversimplifications, and misunderstandings
are later corrected. Too often our discomfort with numbers means that
we fail to challenge, or even recognize, the subjective assessments made
in the compilation and presentation of numerical information.
Additionally, numeracy involves more than the ability to perform
mechanical calculations: it is a way of thinking with a distinct
language. As a result, innumeracy limits more than just our ability to
work with numbers; it limits our ability to think about legal issues
involving numbers. Even where we do have doubts about the accuracy
or objectiveness of numerical information, lawyers often lack the ability
to effectively think through or express these doubts because of a
discomfort and unfamiliarity with the language of numbers. Thus, we
are less likely to self-correct our errors or identify underlying
inconsistencies than if we had a greater degree of facility with numbers.
Finally, and most intangibly, it may be that, especially in a world so
focused on science and technology, innumeracy simply matters by
concealing the inner workings of the law in a troubling way,
119. In addition, it places the burden on the government to monitor and
catch math errors by attorneys. At a time when funding for the IRS is
subject to repeated cuts, limiting its ability to conduct audits, such
miscalculations contribute to the difference between what taxpayers owe
in taxes and what they pay each year. See The Tax Gap, Internal
Revenue Serv. (Jan. 7, 2013), http://www.irs.gov/uac/The-Tax-Gap
(explaining “tax gap” calculations).
120. Similarly, even Mr. Collins’s acquittal was far from costless to both him
and the state, as it consumed substantial amounts of time, money, and
emotional energy.
121. Known as the “annual exclusion amount,” it is currently equal to
$14,000. See I.R.C. § 2503(b) (2006); Rev. Proc. 2012-41, 2012-45 I.R.B.
539, 541 (setting forth the inflation adjustment for 2013). For a
discussion of annual gifting techniques for FLP interests, see generally
Repetti, supra note 40.
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undermining the legitimacy of the resulting legal rules and outcomes.
Below, I examine each of these ways that innumeracy limits our
understanding of legal issues.
A.

Overvaluing Numerical Information

Lawyers who are not comfortable working with numbers oftentimes
overvalue them. Instead of thinking critically about numbers, we mistake
their preciseness and concreteness for accuracy and objectivity,122 and we
leave unquestioned the underlying assumptions on which data collection
is based and calculations are made. By overvaluing numerical
information, lawyers treat calculations as a black box—to be accepted
and looked at from the outside, but not opened for the inner workings to
be understood and appropriately challenged. The result is that
innumeracy separates numbers from their underlying meanings.
A further aspect of Collins provides a classic example of this sort
of overvaluation. While not the focus of its opinion, as a tertiary issue
the court worried that Mr. Collins’s defense counsel was unable to
effectively defend his client from the prosecutor’s “engaging but logically
irrelevant expert demonstration” because of his lack of statistical
training.123 Not only did mathematics bewitch the jury, but it also
enchanted the lawyers. 124 Without the skills needed to look behind the
probabilities and statistical analysis put forward by the prosecutor,
Mr. Collins’s lawyer was unable even to begin to rebut the
prosecution’s case. As a result, Mr. Collins was convicted despite the
lack of any data or statistical analysis underlying the probabilistic
evidence presented.
One consequence of this overvaluation is that lawyers fail to
question or even recognize the existence of the subjective judgments
that underlie numerical information. Michael Meyerson and William
Meyerson have focused attention on the problem with respect to judges:
Too many judges . . . fail to see that the meaning to be given to
mathematical results is frequently not a matter of scientific
necessity, but a reflection of specific value judgments. By
ignoring those judgments that are inherent in the mathematical
122. Historian Patricia Cline Cohen noted a similar concern outside the legal
arena: “Well into the nineteenth century, the novelty of numbers, and
especially their concreteness, conferred such reality on quantitative data
that few people were moved to examine the process by which they had
been generated. The specificity of numbers was mistaken for accuracy
and exactitude.” Patricia Cline Cohen, A Calculating People:
The Spread of Numeracy in Early America 211 (1982).
123. People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33, 38 (Cal. 1968) (en banc).
124. Presumably, even the prosecutor did not understand the failings of the
probabilistic evidence he proffered or he would not have introduced it
into evidence.

795

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 3 ·2013
Illuminating Innumeracy
choices, judges have acquiesced to values that are at odds with
our system of justice. 125

For the Meyersons, this blind acquiescence results in mathematical
rather than judicial policy making 126: he who controls the numbers,
controls the policies. In similar fashion, when lawyers overvalue math,
they fail to see the subjective perspectives informing the compilation,
calculation, and presentation of numerical information. Instead, they
rely on opposing counsel or experts to explain reality through a lens
of their own self-interested making.
The phenomenon of overvaluation may help explain the wide
acceptance of the now-dominant formula for valuing the respective
interests in a hybrid-property home on divorce. 127 On its face, the
formula seems to make sense: simply compute the dollar value of the
respective contributions to the home’s value and divide any
appreciation based on the resulting ratio. Yet on closer analysis it is
clear that it in fact does not make economic sense. It may be that the
very mathematical formulation of the approach—nmc/tc × e =
nonmarital property 128—has created a visceral impression of its
sophistication (and thus its correctness) and dissuaded serious
analysis.
Numbers and statistics do not speak for themselves; they require
interpretation to have meaning. 129 When lawyers are taken in by a
facade of objectivity, they overvalue the numerical interpretations of
others. We need mathematical competence and confidence to
understand the difference between math that looks good and math
that is good to effectively represent our clients.
B.

Failing to Speak the Language of Numbers

Numeracy also matters to our ability to even think about
numerical information. Because mathematics has its own language
and is a distinct system of thought, 130 lawyers must be comfortable
with its vocabulary and syntax in order to be able to formulate and
express criticisms of numerical data. Numerical fluency allows for
argument and analysis rather than rhetoric and suppositions. 131
125. Meyerson & Meyerson, supra note 17, at 776; see also supra note 54
(listing the Meyersons’ areas of research).
126. See Meyerson & Meyerson, supra note 17, at 845.
127. See supra notes 55–66 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 55–66 and accompanying text (explaining the formula).
129. Paulos, supra note 32, at xiv.
130. Cf. id. at xiii (“[M]athematics [is] a way of thinking and a set of
intricately connected higher-level skills . . . .”).
131. In reference to the current debates over Medicare, Professor David
Hyman has stated only somewhat facetiously that “our efforts at
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Without understanding the language of math, lawyers will find
themselves confused and ineffective in the face of numerical data. For
example, while Mr. Collins’s defense counsel objected to the
probabilistic evidence the prosecution presented, 132 he lacked the
ability to articulate why the testimony was problematic. As a result,
his objections were overruled and Mr. Collins was convicted based on
faulty inferences posing as numerical facts.
Even with time for reflection, Mr. Collins’s counsel did little
better on appeal. 133 Although he rightly pointed to the high likelihood
of interdependence among the factors provided by the prosecutor, 134
his “speculation about the nature of that interdependence was too
goofy” to include in the court’s opinion 135: while he attempted to peer
into the shadows to see what stood behind the government’s numbers,
he was unable to do so without the language of math. 136 Instead, the
court provided its own articulation of the prosecution’s failings in the
absence of coherent guidance from the defense in overturning the
conviction. 137 The point is that a key limitation imposed by
innumeracy is a linguistic one: without a solid grounding in
mathematics, lawyers are unable to articulate criticisms of numerical
information, even when they perceive that it has weaknesses.
C.

Legitimacy, Meaning, and the Practice of Law

Both the overvaluation of numerical information and the failure
to speak the language of numbers hamper the efforts of lawyers to
represent their clients well. While some errors based in innumeracy
destroying public education in the United States . . . ha[ve] rendered a
large chunk of the population functionally innumerate. The impassioned
defenses of Medicare offered by most health policy analysts will
accordingly be resolved at the level of rhetoric, instead of through
simple addition and subtraction.” David A. Hyman, Medicare Meets
Mephistopheles, 60 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1165, 1200 (2003) (footnotes
omitted).
132. See supra notes 83–85 and accompanying text.
133. Mr. Collins had different counsel on appeal than at trial. Fisher, supra
note 19, at 72–73. Neither lawyer, though, was able to effectively
identify and explain the mathematical shortfalls in the prosecution’s
case. Id.
134. See supra text accompanying note 78.
135. Fisher, supra note 19, at 73.
136. Similarly, commentators have asserted that the inconsistent language
concerning statistical concepts such as background rates and
confounding variables used by courts in deciding environmental disputes
has contributed to a lack of unity in the law. Taggart & Blackmon,
supra note 71, at 299.
137. See Fisher, supra note 19, at 72–73 (noting that the court relied
heavily on the work of a law clerk with a mathematics background).
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are corrected, are efficient, or prove of little significance, others pose
grave threats to a client’s economic well-being, freedom, or life. And
numeracy matters for other, less-tangible reasons as well.
The practice of law—from e-mail communication to word
processing to e-discovery—rests on a base of numbers, math, and
science. Many practice areas, such as those that involve patent
prosecution, drafting licensing agreements, performing due diligence
for high-tech start-up companies, and litigating temporary restraining
orders against competitors infringing on intellectual property rights,
are rooted in technology. That innumeracy is accepted, and even
celebrated, in the legal profession means that many lawyers cannot
contribute their voices and critical thinking abilities to some of the
many interesting and novel legal questions their clients routinely face.
As a result, the practice of law is less client-oriented, and less vibrant,
than it could be.
In addition, progress in some fields is hampered as lawyers and
lawmakers repeatedly engage in low-level thinking, never getting to
higher levels of analysis when decisive questions are numerically
based. Wayne Blackmon and Aaron Taggart argue that the law’s
discomfort with mathematical terms means that the evidentiary wheel
is repeatedly reinvented with respect to statistical base rates in
environmental policy disputes, with each case being decided on its
own facts. 138 Disappointed in the lack of coherence in the case law,
they opine that “[m]any great legal questions involving math and
science get superficial or inappropriate treatment” because of lawyers’
lack of mathematical confidence. 139
Ultimately, to the extent innumeracy prevails in the law, legal
decisions are less than fully comprehensible and transparent. Even
laypersons who are not highly numerate may feel put off when legal
formulas and results are not numerically sound. Like commentators
troubled by the Brandenburg formula or Mr. Collins’s counsel
recognizing that the probabilities entered into evidence were flawed but
in each case being unable to articulate why, some individuals intuitively
recognize the existence of numerical sleights of hand with the result
that innumeracy undermines the legitimacy of our legal system.
Without an understanding of what numbers do and do not mean,
numerical information is at best meaningless, and at worst harmful:
tax liabilities are miscalculated, 140 wealth is shifted unintentionally
and invisibly between parties, 141 costly disputes are prolonged,142 and
138. Taggart & Blackmon, supra note 71, at 276.
139. Id. at 275.
140. See supra notes 39–53 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 54–68 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 138.
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defendants are erroneously convicted, 143 all with the result that the
legitimacy of our legal system is lessened. As one court has noted,
“people must be sure of what they are looking for, and how they can
prove it, before they start fooling with algebra.” 144 Even when done
well, the selection, presentation, and calculation of numbers conveys
and obscures meanings and values. 145 Lawyers must have the
numerical competence and confidence to understand and challenge the
assumptions and perspectives hiding in the shadows behind such
mathematical data.

III. Defining the Problem: Competence or Confidence?
Given the pervasiveness and significance of numbers to the
practice of law, why are so many lawyers innumerate? Is it a lack of
competence, produced either by cognitive disability or by a persistent
failure to engage with numbers and calculations so that they never
learn the skills necessary for numeracy? Or is it, instead, a lack of
confidence—a reflection of the fact that many lawyers excelled at
reading and writing, and so, by comparison, grew to believe they were
bad at math? While the fact of innumeracy in lawyers is well
accepted, the reasons remain unexplored. Understanding the basis of
innumeracy is the first step to overcoming it.
A.

Objective Innumeracy

Objective innumeracy is characterized by a lack of numerical
competence. 146 It may be evidence of an underlying cognitive
disability or the result of a lack of numeric education. Regardless of
which of these shortcomings causes the issue, an individual who is
objectively innumerate does not possess the tools necessary for
thinking about and calculating numbers.
1.

Deficits in Cognitive Functioning

One biological cause of objective innumeracy is developmental
dyscalculia. 147
The
mathematical
equivalent
of
dyslexia,
143. See supra notes 72–86 and accompanying text.
144. Branion v. Gramly, 855 F.2d 1256, 1264 (7th Cir. 1988).
145. Cf. Meyerson & Meyerson, supra note 17 (criticizing the racism and
sexism embodied in statistical tables and commonly reflected in damages
awards).
146. See Wendy Nelson et al., Clinical Implications of Numeracy: Theory
and Practice, 35 Annals Behav. Med. 261, 264 (2008) (distinguishing
between objective and subjective innumeracy).
147. Dyscalculia can also be caused by traumatic brain injury, but that
form is not the focus of this discussion. See David C. Geary,
Mathematical Disabilities: Cognitive, Neuropsychological, and Genetic
Components, 114 Psychol. Bull. 345, 345 (1993) (distinguishing
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developmental dyscalculia is marked by structural abnormalities in
the part of the brain that performs mathematical calculations and is
thought to be heritable. 148 It exists in 5–7% of the population and is,
at times, paired with other developmental disorders such as dyslexia
and attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder. 149 It is not, though,
associated with low intelligence or low academic achievement
generally. 150
For individuals with dyscalculia, numbers lack meaning. The size
and relative value of numbers are not readily apparent, making it
difficult for a dyscalculic individual to manipulate numbers or think
about the relationship between them. 151 Common indicators of
dyscalculia include the need to count (sometimes on fingers) to
compare or add numbers, as well as difficulty in making numerical
estimates. 152 For example, a dyscalculic individual might estimate the
height of a normal room as two hundred feet, or, to determine which
of two playing cards is greater, he might count all of the symbols on
each card. 153
Relatively little research has been done on the causes and
consequences of developmental dyscalculia, 154 an omission that is par-

acquired and developmental dyscalculia). Other biological bases for
objective innumeracy may be attention-deficit disorders and anxiety
disorders. In either case, it is not clear whether the often-associated
difficulties with math are a product of the disorder or a second cognitive
deficit. See Anna J. Wilson, Dyscalculia Primer and Resource Guide,
Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., http://www.oecd.org/edu/
ceri/dyscalculiaprimerandresourceguide.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2013).
148. See generally Brian Butterworth et al., Dyscalculia: From Brain to
Education, 332 Science 1049 (2011) (describing the neurology and
effects of dyscalculia and proposing research into interventions for it).
149. Id. at 1049. But see Wilson, supra note 147 (citing research showing a
prevalence of 3–6%).
150. See Butterworth et al., supra note 148, at 1049 (“The disability can be
highly selective, affecting learners with normal intelligence and normal
working memory . . . .”); see also Nelson et al., supra note 146, at 261
(“Low numeracy cannot be reliably inferred on the basis of patients’
education, intelligence, or other observable characteristics.”); Wilson,
supra note 147 (noting that all definitions of dyscalculia recognize some
degree of specificity to the disability rather than being associated with
universal academic difficulties).
151. Butterworth et al., supra note 148, at 1050.
152. Id. at 1049.
153. Id.
154. See id. (observing that between 2000 and 2011 the National Institutes of
Health spent $107.2 million on dyslexia research and only $2.3 million
on dyscalculia research); Geary, supra note 147, at 358 (noting that
“relatively little is known about mathematical learning disorders”);
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ticularly striking in light of the attention that scientists, educators, and
policy makers have given to dyslexia and other reading disabilities.
Moreover, due to this lack of research, little is known about the populations in which it is most prevalent. 155 One important area for future
research is the prevalence of developmental dyscalculia among lawyers.
Because of the widespread perception that lawyers are not—and
need not be—good at math, it seems likely that dyscalculic individuals
are overrepresented in the law when compared to professionals in fields
explicitly requiring numerical analysis, like medicine, business, accounting, science, engineering, and graduate-level social sciences. Highachieving dyscalculic individuals, especially those for whom the
disability is not paired with dyslexia or another reading disability,
might seek out legal careers to capitalize on their strengths in the belief
that their lack of numeracy will not impair them professionally. If in
fact dyscalculic individuals are overrepresented, or even just normally
represented, among lawyers, specific interventions, such as identifying
legal fields in which numerical competence is of reduced importance and
consciously pairing highly numerate and dyscalculic individuals on law
school assignments and in practice, might well be implemented.
2.

Deficits in Mathematics Education

Not all cases of innumeracy reflect a cognitive disability. Instead,
some individuals simply do not have the education needed for
mathematical competence. It is not that they cannot do math, but
rather that they have not learned to do it. Underlying this form of
innumeracy may be deficient math instruction 156 or a simple lack of
personal motivation with respect to learning the subject. 157
Most law students do not come to law school with strong math
backgrounds. In fact, fewer than 10% of law school students have
more than an insignificant amount of undergraduate training in math,
science, or engineering. 158 Prior training in statistics is also unusual. 159
Wilson, supra note 147 (describing dyscalculia research as “just in its
infancy”).
155. See Butterworth et al., supra note 148, at 1053 (noting that dyscalculia
is not widely recognized by educators and that recognition is vital for
subsequent improvement).
156. Researchers have suggested that one issue may be the emphasis on the
mechanics of math in school without a corresponding emphasis on
understanding how to apply those mechanics. See Stanislas Dehaene,
The Number Sense: How the Mind Creates Mathematics 141
(1997).
157. Cf. Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy Education, 94 Iowa L.
Rev. 197, 202 (2008) (“People are financially illiterate not because they
are stupid, but because they have better things to do with their time.”).
158. See Mark Graham & Bryan Adamson, Law Students’ Undergraduate
Major: Implications for Law School Academic Support Programs
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In writing about the relationship between science and legal decision
making, David Faigman noted that “law students, as a group, seem
particularly averse to math and science. . . . Students who display a
talent in math and science typically pursue careers in medicine,
engineering, biology, chemistry, computer science, and similar subjects.
Students with less inclination toward quantitative analysis very often
go to law school.” 160 In short, many law students lack a solid math
background.
Once in law school, this deficit is not corrected. Most law schools
include few, if any, explicitly numerically focused classes in their
curricula. 161 When offered, these classes are often considered necessary
only for the practice of corporate law or tax law; few students not
already planning to enter one of these fields opt into these courses. 162
This is a unique feature of legal education. Unlike other graduate-level
programs such as those in the natural and social sciences, successful
completion of law school generally does not require even a basic level
of competence in statistics, quantitative methods, or mathematics.163
By contrast, medical school students are expected to learn the basics
(ASPs), 69 UMKC L. Rev. 533, 549 (2001) (finding that only 9 out of
102 law students had this background); Peter Lee, Patent Law and the
Two Cultures, 120 Yale L.J. 2 (2010) (less than 10% of law students
have degrees in these areas); see also Daniel Keating, Ten Myths About
Law School Grading, 76 Wash. U. L.Q. 171, 171 (1998) (postulating
that law students’ misunderstanding of law school grading is based in
part on the fact that “most law students had non-mathematical majors
in college”); Woronoff, supra note 101, at 252 (“Often [law students]
majored in undergraduate subjects in which they never had to use
sophisticated mathematical concepts.”).
159. See Steven B. Dow, There’s Madness in the Method: A Commentary on
Law, Statistics, and the Nature of Legal Education, 57 Okla. L. Rev.
579, 595 (2004) (noting that an earlier prediction that lawyers would
become skilled in statistics was “largely wrong”).
160. Faigman, supra note 88, at v.
161. For example, of 24 law schools surveyed, almost half offered no
numerically focused classes and one-third offered only one such class. Of
course, a law student may be permitted to take classes in other
departments, and classes not obviously numerically focused may include
significant numerical analysis or calculation (and even those seemingly
more mathematical might avoid calculations), but the point is that most
law schools prioritize neither math teaching nor numerical analysis in
their curricula. See infra Appendix (listing the schools surveyed and the
numerically focused classes offered).
162. See, e.g., Woronoff, supra note 101, at 252 (“[M]any people who go to
law school do not want to learn material that requires understanding
complex mathematical concepts. I’m not saying everyone, but I do think
a large portion of law students have no desire to take courses that
require proficiency with numerical ideas.” (footnote omitted)).
163. Dow, supra note 159, at 579.
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of statistics, read research articles replete with statistical analysis, and
relate that research to medical problems they encounter. 164 One study
that examined the effect of graduate training on students’ reasoning
ability found that, while medical and psychology programs improved
students’ statistical-methodological reasoning abilities to a significant
degree, law programs failed to do so. 165
Law professors often share the numerical discomfort of their
students. 166 Even when numbers and calculations are not edited out of
the cases in casebooks, in many instances law professors gloss over
them, instead giving preference to discussions of theories, arguments,
holdings, and procedure. The implicit message to students is that
math has little, if any, bearing on the practice of law. The content
and context of legal education are such that any numerical skills that
students may possess upon entering law school may well be dulled
through three years of disuse.
While tests for cognitive disabilities that result in innumeracy
exist, 167 this subject remains relatively unexplored as a general matter.
And, as for lawyers, the problem of objective innumeracy is completely
unexamined. Whether a product of an underlying biological condition
like dyscalculia or a lack of mathematics education, objective
innumeracy limits a lawyer’s effectiveness in representing clients. At the
least, it requires some lawyers to rely entirely on more numerate
individuals whose interests may not be aligned with a client’s interests
for the calculations and assessments needed for the practice of law.

164. See Darrin R. Lehman et al., The Effects of Graduate Training on
Reasoning: Formal Discipline and Thinking About Everyday-Life
Events, 43 Am. Psychologist 431, 440 (1988) (examining the medical
curriculum at the University of Michigan). Even here, though, some
commentators have criticized doctors’ ability to understand and
communicate medical risk based on probabilistic data. See, e.g., Kuklin,
supra note 15, at 527.
165. Lehman et al., supra note 164, at 440. Statistical reasoning is the ability
to reason using statistical ideas, often involving ideas about data,
chance, and risk, while methodological reasoning involves understanding
causal relationships and the role of confounding variables in the
scientific process. Id. at 434. Law programs are not alone in this
shortcoming, though. Graduate chemistry students similarly showed no
improvement in these types of reasoning. Id.
166. See, e.g., Keating, supra note 158, at 171 (opining that law professors
lack both math skills and an interest in math); Meyerson & Meyerson,
supra note 17, at 772 (same).
167. See generally Lipkus et al., supra note 4 (developing a test to assess
basic arithmetic and statistical skills); Lisa M. Schwartz et al., The Role
of Numeracy in Understanding the Benefit of Screening Mammography,
127 Annals Internal Med. 966 (1997) (setting forth a simple threequestion test of objective numeracy).
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B.

Subjective Innumeracy

As with objective innumeracy, subjective innumeracy—that is, a
lack of confidence in working with numbers—is not limited to
individuals with low intelligence. Instead, it occurs with equal
frequency across the intelligence spectrum and is present even among
highly educated individuals. 168 This lack of confidence may have an
underlying biological cause such as math anxiety, which causes an
objectively numerate individual to experience tension or fear when
faced with mathematical tasks. 169 In other individuals, subjective
innumeracy may result from feelings of inadequacy with respect to
math in relation to other cognitive tasks. In other words, an
individual with a high degree of competence in reading and writing
might simply feel inadequate in his mathematical ability by
comparison, even though in an objective sense the person possesses
good math skills. The important point is that each cause of subjective
innumeracy in lawyers—whether math anxiety or relative
incompetence—requires much closer attention than it has received in
the past. In the remainder of this Part III, I offer some preliminary
thoughts on these long-overlooked difficulties that many lawyers face.
1.

Math Anxiety

Math anxiety is a biological condition in which feelings of
discomfort, nervousness, or fear interfere with an individual’s ability
to perform tasks requiring mathematical ability. 170 Someone with
math anxiety may avoid learning or practicing numerical analyses in
order to avoid the associated feelings of panic, leading to objective
innumeracy. 171 Alternatively, math anxiety may cause otherwise
math-competent individuals to lose confidence in their math ability,
associating the biological markers of anxiety with a lack of actual
ability when confronted with problems as basic as 46 + 18 = ? and
34 – 19 = ?. 172 Not surprisingly, mental arithmetic causes substantially
more anxiety than that done on paper.173 Working with mixed-fraction
168. Lipkus et al., supra note 4, at 37.
169. See Wilson, supra note 147 (“ ‘Math anxiety’ is the name given to the
feeling of tension and fear that some children and adults experience, and
which is often specifically associated with mathematical activity.”
(citation omitted)).
170. Mark H. Ashcraft, Math Anxiety: Personal, Educational, and Cognitive
Consequences, 11 Current Directions Psychol. Sci. 181, 181
(2002).
171. See id. (summarizing research showing that highly math anxious
individuals “take fewer elective math courses, both in high school and in
college, than people with low math anxiety”).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 182.
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problems, 174 percentages, basic algebra, and factoring, as compared
with doing arithmetic involving whole numbers, also heightens
unease. 175 Of particular concern to lawyers, individuals with a high
degree of math anxiety often speed through the most difficult tasks in
order to minimize the time they spend on anxiety-provoking work,
with a correspondingly high increase in errors. 176
Achievement tests bear out the fact that math anxiety can exist
alongside math competence. 177 One study involved participants
identified as having math anxiety who were tested for math
competence before and after receiving treatment for the condition. 178
Even though they were not taught any additional math skills and did
not practice math as part of the treatment, after treatment they
showed significant improvement in math achievement scores. 179 This
improvement suggests that the scores achieved prior to treatment
reflected a lower level of competence than the participants actually
had. 180 In the real world, math-anxious individuals begin to develop
negative perceptions of their mathematical ability. 181 Over time, a
self-perpetuating cycle takes hold as students who believe they are
bad at math avoid taking math classes to avoid the associated
anxiety. 182
Math anxiety is correlated with high anxiety generally, although
math anxiety is believed to be a form of anxiety that is distinct from
general anxiety or test anxiety. 183 Moreover, women self-report math
anxiety at a higher rate than do men. 184 Certain teaching methods are

174. For example, 10 1⁄4 – 7 2⁄3 = ?. Id. at 182.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 183.
177. See id. at 181 (noting that timed, online tests revealed math anxiety
effects, while achievement tests revealed no competence differences).
178. Id. at 182–83 (citing Ray Hembree, The Nature, Effects, and Relief of
Mathematics Anxiety, 21 J. for Res. Mathematics Educ. 33 (1990)).
179. Id. at 183.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 181–82.
182. Id. at 182.
183. Id. (noting that those with high math anxiety also have high anxiety in
other areas, but that math anxiety is nonetheless a “separate
phenomenon”).
184. See id. (hypothesizing that this might reflect a greater willingness by
women to admit to such anxiety instead of an actual greater
occurrence).
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correlated with math anxiety in students. 185 For example, students
with teachers who demand correctness without providing
corresponding support may develop math anxiety based on feelings of
vulnerability. 186
As with students with dyscalculia, students with math anxiety
may well choose law disproportionately over other professions because
of the perception that math ability is not important to the practice of
law. For these students, law school becomes a sophisticated mathavoidance mechanism that deflects attention from an underlying—and
professionally significant—personal and practical problem. This
danger merits attention, in part because math anxiety in the law
student population responds well to treatment and relief alone can
improve a student’s math performance. In addition, it is an area in
which there is strong evidence that approaches to teaching can
exacerbate or relieve underlying anxiety.
To minimize math anxiety, professors including math in their
courses should ensure that students know from the outset that they will
be expected to discuss numerical information in class 187 so that they can
prepare appropriately ahead of time.188 Class discussions of numerical
aspects of cases should be situated to help all students, including efforts
to prevent the more anxious students from minimizing the time they
spend on math 189 or focusing on their anxiety rather than on what they
can do. 190 At the least, law professors should be cognizant of the forms

185. Id. at 184 (citing Julianne C. Turner et al., The Classroom Environment
and Students’ Reports of Avoidance Strategies in Mathematics: A
Multimethod Study, 94 J. Educ. Psychol. 88 (2002)).
186. Id. (citing Turner, supra note 185, at 101).
187. Professor Woronoff reports that the course description for his Venture
Capital class explicitly states: “Math competence through algebra is
assumed and important.” Woronoff, supra note 101, at 253. Similarly,
on the syllabus for my Trusts & Estates class, I recommend that the
students bring a calculator to the final, alerting them to the fact that
math is a component of the course from the start.
188. See Ashcraft, supra note 170, at 182 (identifying time-pressured mental
math as more anxiety provoking than when math is performed in
writing).
189. See supra text accompanying note 176, discussing this issue.
190. See Ashcraft, supra note 170, at 183–84 (discussing the tendency of
individuals with high math anxiety to focus on disrupting thoughts such
as “one’s dislike or fear of math, one’s low self-confidence, and the like”
rather than the task presented, so that “paying attention to these
intrusive thoughts acts like a secondary task, distracting attention from
the math task”).
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of teaching that may lead to math anxiety in order to avoid needlessly
increasing anxiety in law students.191
2.

Relative Competence

Subjective innumeracy often surfaces even in the absence of
biological factors such as anxiety. One explanation for this type of
innumeracy may be a lack of relative competence. The problem arises
because individuals who do less well in math than in other academic
areas learn to self-identify as bad at math relative to their other
strengths. In other words, students who perform at a high level on
tasks requiring reading and writing, but only moderately well on
quantitative tasks, may undervalue their math competence and thus
develop a self-perception of innumeracy that does not correlate with
objective reality.
Tests of subjective numeracy with respect to statistics illustrate the
important difference between objective and subjective innumeracy. 192 In
particular, the STAT-Confidence Scale tests subjects’ confidence in
their ability to understand medical statistics by asking individuals to
self-assess their competence. 193 Actual results on this test only weakly
correlate with objective measures of math skills, thus showing a high
degree of independence of objective and subjective innumeracy. 194 Put
simply, the test shows that an individual who has the objective
capacity to work competently with numbers may lack confidence in his
ability to do so—and act accordingly.
Professor David Hyman has suggested that one explanation for
lawyers’ inability to do basic arithmetic is that they had higher scores
on the verbal part of the Scholastic Aptitude Test than on the math
part. 195 To the extent this is true, this greater facility with verbal and
191. For example, researchers have identified professors who demand
correctness without providing explanations for mistakes and
misunderstandings as one cause of math avoidance in students. Id. at
184 (citing Turner, supra note 185, at 101).
192. But see Nelson, supra note 146, at 265 (summarizing research that tests
subjective innumeracy using questions that measure participants’
perception of their numerical ability and preferences for whether
information should be presented using numbers or verbal descriptions,
and finding a significant correlation between subjective and objective
numeracy (citing Angela Fagerlin et al., Measuring Numeracy Without a
Math Test: Development of the Subjective Numeracy Scale, 27 Med.
Decision Making 672, 672–80 (2007))).
193. Id. (citing Steven Woloshin et al., Patients and Medical Statistics:
Interest, Confidence, and Ability, 20 J. Gen. Internal Med. 996
(2005)).
194. Id. at 266 (explaining that “the STAT-Confidence scale showed only a
weak correlation (r = 0.15; p = 0.04) with an objective measure of
numeracy, the Medical Data Interpretation Test”).
195. Hyman, supra note 131, at 1168 n.12.
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written tasks may very well contribute to subjective innumeracy
among lawyers. Lawyers, after all, are accustomed to overachieving on
verbal tasks throughout their lives. Thus, they may have developed
early self-identities as being bad at math in comparison to their
verbal achievements. This self-identification then becomes a selffulfilling prophecy, as they seek out tasks that reinforce their (verbal)
strengths and avoid those that play to their (numerical) weaknesses.
To the extent a crisis of confidence underlies law students’
innumeracy, law schools cannot rely on students to choose the classes
they most need. Instead, professors interested in improving their
students’ numeracy should include confidence-building math exercises—
for example, simply working through the calculation of damages in a
case and the allocation of the proceeds—in classroom discussions.
Numerical information should be presented in multiple ways to reach
as many students as possible and to help them become competent
with thinking about numbers from multiple perspectives. 196 Numerical
tasks that build progressively 197 and appropriately on each other over
the course of the semester may assist students in developing
numerical competence through familiarity, repetition, and the
application of quantitative reasoning skills to actual legal situations.
We should expect and reward tenacity in identifying and solving
mathematical problems to encourage students to persevere in
understanding numerical information.
Innumeracy is a real, although not insurmountable, problem for
many lawyers. It is also largely unexamined in the legal and scientific
literature. Whether the product of objective or subjective factors,
innumeracy contributes to a perception that lawyers in general are
bad at math. Because of the importance of sound math skills to the
practice of law, empirical research into innumeracy is needed. 198 This
research should consider whether, and the extent to which, each form
of innumeracy is present in law students and lawyers, with a goal of
providing useful guidance to law professors in helping students
overcome the problem before beginning to practice law.

196. Cf. Lipkus et al., supra note 4, at 42 (stating that “verbal translations
that accompany numeric risks may help people better comprehend risk
messages,” and suggesting that visual displays may assist in the effective
communication of numerical data).
197. To this end, Professor Michael Woronoff asserts that he teaches
fundamental venture capital mathematical concepts incrementally by
starting with very simple examples, then building in complexity by
adding elements to the analysis throughout the course of the semester.
Woronoff, supra note 101, at 253.
198. Arden Rowell, of the University of Illinois College of Law, has recently
begun such research. See Rowell & Bregant, supra note 11.
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Conclusion: Moving Past Innumeracy
Innumeracy matters. Just as reading, writing, and forming coherent
legal arguments are skills we expect all lawyers to have, numeracy is
critical to the practice of law. We must make a conscious effort to
identify what underlies innumeracy in the law—an objective lack of
mathematical ability or a subjective lack of confidence, or both—so that
we can better understand its prevalence, causes, and solutions.
On a systemic level, law schools need to provide the necessary
resources to transmit numerical skills to their students. Medical schools
could serve as a model for this, with their focus on teaching and
applying basic mathematical analysis to medical problems. To the
extent empirical studies show that dyscalculia is a particular disability
of law students, moreover, law schools should design appropriate
accommodations for coursework, testing, and career counseling.
In the classroom, professors interested in enhancing the numeracy
of their students should focus attention on the numerical components
of cases no less than they do those cases’ nonnumerical aspects. At
least some professors should integrate readings or numerical analysis
into casebooks, or supplement existing casebooks with case excerpts
including numerical information.
Law students, too, have a role to play in improving their own
numeracy. They should take responsibility for ensuring they have the
skills they need before they leave law school. To the extent this is an
area of concern for students, they should make it clear to
administrators that courses improving quantitative reasoning skills are
important and hold their professors accountable for working through
the numerical aspects of cases. They should struggle to understand
what a calculation means, what assumptions are behind a statistic,
and how a formula acts across the range of applicable scenarios. Most
of all, they should ask for clarification without apology: ultimately
each law student is responsible for ensuring he receives the numerical
training and exposure he needs for the successful practice of law.
With this background, lawyers will enter the field with the skills
they need to understand and soundly use numerical information. Once
in practice, lawyers should utilize experts to ensure that legal
outcomes reflect good math. 199 Moreover, they should take care to
understand numerical evidence just as they work to understand all
other types of evidence presented and be cautious of introducing
statistical evidence they do not fully understand.
199. Similarly, Professor Daniel Rubinfeld has suggested that courts appoint
neutral experts as needed to advise on technical and statistical matters
based on an arbitration model. See Rubinfeld, supra note 90, at 1095;
see also Meyerson & Meyerson, supra note 17, at 775 (“On more subtle
points of mathematics or science, it would be appropriate for judges to
turn to experts to help identify whether proposed evidence is ‘good
science.’ ”).
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It is time that we stop pretending that numbers and math are not
important in the practice of law. As lawyers, lawmakers, law
professors, and law students, we need to take responsibility for
illuminating the meanings hiding in the shadows of numerical
information.
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Appendix
Survey of Numerically Focused Law Classes a
Law School

Numerically Focused Classes Offered

Appalachian School of Law b
Ave Maria School of Law c
Baylor Law School d
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law e
California Western School of Law f
Campbell Law School g

None
None
Basic Tax & Accounting for Lawyers
None
Accounting for Lawyers
None
Financial Statement Analysis &
Interpretation
Statistics for Lawyers
None

Columbia Law School h
Drake University Law School i
Dwayne O. Andreas School of Law j
(Barry University)
Florida State University College of Law k

Harvard Law School l

John Marshall Law School m
(Atlanta, GA)
Loyola Marymount University n
(Los Angeles, CA)

None
None
Analytical Methods for Lawyers
Applied Quantitative Analysis
Financial Statement Analysis
Fundamentals of Statistical Analysis
Introduction to Accounting &
Corporate Financial Reports
Accounting for Lawyers

New York University School of Law o
Pacific McGeorge School of Law p
Saint Louis University School of Law q
SMU Dedman School of Law r
Stanford Law School s
Texas Tech University School of Law t
Tulane University Law School u
University of Chicago Law School v
Villanova Law School w
West Virginia University College of Law x
Yale Law School y
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Accounting for Income Taxes
Accounting for Lawyers
Accounting for Lawyers
Accounting for Tax Consequences
Quantitative Methods in Law I
Quantitative Methods in Law II
Accounting for Lawyers
None
Tax Accounting
Accounting
Research Design for Empirical Legal
Studies
Accounting for Lawyers
None
Advanced Law & Economics
Financial Accounting for Lawyers
Fundamentals of Accounting for
Attorneys
Accounting for Lawyers
None
Legal Accounting
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a.

The table includes classes offered at schools ranked 1–6, 51–56, and 101–106
in U.S. News & World Reports’ 2012 law school rankings and the first six
schools alphabetically of those that are unranked. See Best Law Schools,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., http://grad-schools.usnews.rankingsandreviews.
com/best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools/law-rankings (last visited Jan.
13, 2013). Classes emphasizing the development of numerical analysis or
mathematical skills are included; those only incidentally employing math
are not. In a few cases, two sections of the same class were offered
during the surveyed period; in each case, such duplicative offerings were
counted only once. All web addresses listed in this Appendix were last
visited February 13, 2013.

b.

2011–2012 Catalog, Appalachian Sch. Law, http://www.asl.edu/Documents/
Student%20Services/Admissions/2011-2012%20ASL%20Catalog.pdf.

c.

Course Descriptions, Ave Maria Sch. Law, http://legacy.avemarialaw.
edu/index.cfm?event=academics.coursedescriptions.

d.

Curriculum Information, Baylor L. Sch., http://www.baylor.edu/law/
ps/index.php?id=75581; Schedule of Classes, BAYLOR L. SCH., https://
www1.baylor.edu/scheduleofclasses/Results.aspx?TermCC=20&Term=1
21&College=LW&Prefix=LAW&StartCN=&EndCN=&Status=&Days
=&Instructor=&IsMini=false.

e.

Upper-Level Courses — Fall 2011, Cardozo Sch. Law, http://www.
cardozo.yu.edu/uploadedFiles/Cardozo/Info_For/Current_Students/Fall2011-Upper-Level-Class-Schedule.pdf; Upper-Level Courses — Spring
2012, CARDOZO SCH. LAW, http://www.cardozo.yu.edu/uploadedFiles/
Cardozo/Profiles/registrar-124/UL%20Block%20Jan%2011%202012.pdf.

f.

Fall 2012 Course Schedule by Requirement, Cal. W. Sch. Law, http://
www.cwsl.edu/content/registrar/20123_sched_require.pdf; Spring 2013
Course Schedule by Requirement, CAL. W. SCH. LAW, http://
www.cwsl.edu/content/registrar/20131_sched_require.pdf.

g.

Course Catalog, Campbell U., http://www.law.campbell.edu/page.
cfm?id=391&n=course-catalog. Class schedules by year are not available
online.

h.

Courses, Columbia L. Sch., http://www.law.columbia.edu/courses (click
on “advanced search” and search for 2011–12 Fall and Spring Term
courses).

i.

2011 Fall Class Offerings, Drake U.L. Sch., http://www.law.drake.edu/
academics/docs/archivedSchedules-fall2011Schedule.pdf;
2012
Spring
Class Offerings, DRAKE U.L. SCH., http://www.law.drake.edu/academics/
docs/archivedSchedules-spring2012Schedule.pdf; 2012 Summer Course
Offerings, DRAKE U.L. SCH., http://www.law.drake.edu/academics/docs/
schedules-summer2012.pdf.

j.

Recent Course Offerings, Barry U., http://www.barry.edu/includes/
docs/law/current-course-listing.pdf.

k.

Schedule of Classes, Fla. St. U. Col. Law, http://www.law.fsu.edu/
academic_programs/curriculum/schedule_of_classes.html.

l.

Course Catalog, Harvard L. Sch., http://www.law.harvard.edu/
academics/curriculum/catalog/index.html.
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m.

Course List — Master, Atlanta’s John Marshall L. Sch., http://
www.johnmarshall.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Course-DescriptionsAJMLS1.pdf; Course Schedule: Spring Semester 2013, ATLANTA’S JOHN
MARSHALL L. SCH., http://www.johnmarshall.edu/wp-content/uploads/
2012/12/2013-Spring-Semester-Schedule-Revised-1-11-132.pdf.

n.

Course Offerings — Fall 2011, Loyola L. Sch. L.A., https://technology.
lls.edu/courses/crs-table.php?yt=2011%20FA&sf=c; Course Offerings —
Spring 2012, LOYOLA L. SCH. L.A., https://technology.lls.edu/courses/
crs-table.php?yt=2012+SP; Course Offerings—Summer 2012, LOYOLA L.
SCH. L.A., https://technology.lls.edu/courses/crs-table.php?yt=2012+SU.

o.

Fall 2011 Schedule of New York Classes, NYU L., https://its.
law.nyu.edu/cms/public/schedules/index.cfm?fuseaction=Public.Areas
OfStudyCategories&Semester=Fall&TermYear=2011&GeoLocID=nyc;
Spring 2012 Schedule of New York Classes, NYU L., https://its.law.
nyu.edu/cms/public/schedules/index.cfm?fuseaction=Public.AreasOf
StudyCategories&Semester=Spring&TermYear=2012&GeoLocID=nyc;
Summer 2012 Schedule of New York Classes, NYU L., https://its.law.
nyu.edu/cms/public/schedules/index.cfm?fuseaction=Public.AreasOf
StudyCategories&Semester=Summer&TermYear=2012&GeoLocID=nyc.

p.

Fall Semester 2012 Academic Schedule, McGeorge L. Sch., http://
www.mcgeorge.edu/Documents/Academics/2012FallAcademicSchedule.pdf;
Spring Semester 2013 Academic Schedule, McGeorge L. Sch.,
http://www.mcgeorge.edu/Documents/Academics/2013SpringAcademic
Schedule.pdf; Pacific McGeorge Summer Sessions 2013, MCGEORGE L.
SCH., http://www.mcgeorge.edu/Documents/Academics/2013Summer
AcademicSchedule.pdf.

q.

Recent Offerings, St. Louis U. Sch. Law, http://www.slu.edu/schoolof-law-home/academics/academic-curriculum/recent-offerings.

r.

Upper Class Courses: Fall 2011, SMU Deadman Sch. Law, http://
www.law.smu.edu/Registrar/App/Upper-Class-Courses.aspx?Term=Fall2011&Year=2; Upper Class Courses: Spring 2012, SMU DEADMAN SCH.
LAW,
http://www.law.smu.edu/Registrar/App/Upper-Class-Courses.
aspx?Term=Spring-2012&Year=2; Upper Class Courses: Summer 2012,
SMU DEADMAN SCH. LAW, http://www.law.smu.edu/Registrar/App/
Upper-Class-Courses.aspx?Term=Summer-2012&Year=2.

s.

Autumn 2012 Course Overview, STANFORD L. SCH., http://lawreg.
stanford.edu/stanford/prereg/course_overview.asp?Term=Fall;
Winter
2013 Course Overview, STANFORD L. SCH., http://lawreg.stanford.edu/
stanford/prereg/course_overview.asp?Term=Winter; Spring 2013 Course
Overview, STANFORD L. SCH., http://lawreg.stanford.edu/stanford/prereg/
course_overview.asp?Term=Spring.

t.

2011–2012 Catalog, TEXAS TECH U. SCH. LAW, http://www.depts.ttu.edu/
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